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COMPETITIVE ORDERS, THE FINAL MONOPOLY, AND
THE SECOND MOST IMPORTANT INVENTION IN
HISTORY
Steven Ferrey"
I. COMPETITION, MONOPOLY, AND POWER ANOMALIES
Monopoly power matters. Law controls the structure and
operation of American business. Government regulatory orders are
changing the conventional monopoly model to promote greater
competition in the second most important invention in history.1
Competition is now being introduced at a brisk pace by government orders
and rules that are affecting the country's last major monopoly industry.2
Electric power is the last of the U.S. regulated industries,3 and is heralded
as the second most important invention of all time.4 The specific laws
enacted for the power sector are critical to the future of the U.S. economy.
This article narrates how, and whether, the law is used to maintain
monopoly or foster greater competition in power amid significant friction
between state and federal regulatory law. The courts must reconcile state
and federal conflicts and address legal anomalies to determine the future of
monopoly and competition in electric power.
For the past two decades, through changing presidential
administrations, the federal government has promoted greater competition
*Steven Ferrey is a Professor of Law at Suffolk University Law School, and was a Visiting
Professor of Law at Harvard Law School in 2003. Since 1993, Professor Ferrey has been a primary
legal consultant to the World Bank and the U.N. Development Program on their work related to the
subject of this article. He has authored 7 books, including the leading treatise on the power industry,
"The Law of Independent Power" 37t
h ed. 2015. He has authored 100 articles. He holds a B.A. in
Economics, a Juris Doctorate degree, a Masters degree in energy and environmental planning, and was
a post-doctoral Fulbright Fellow at the University of London between his graduate degrees.
'James Fallows, The Fifty Greatest Breakthroughs Since the Wheel, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
November 2013, at 56.
2 See infra Section III.
3
STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 502 (Wolters
Kluwer Aspen, 6 h Ed. 2013) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL LAW].
a Fallows, supra note 1.
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in power markets through the federal tax system and through several orders
of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Even though the
power industry has been a monopoly, anti-trust law, the "essential facilities
doctrine," and the Noerr/Pennington doctrine apply to electricity.5 Even
when federal law is contrary to state policy, the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution preempts any state law that is contrary to federal law.
However, federal courts have recently ruled that some of these federal
initiatives are beyond the jurisdiction of the federal government.6
Under the Federal Power Act, and per the U.S.'s federalist system of
laws, states exercise separate legal authority over power, which is distinct
from federal jurisdiction. Some states have used their authority to forcefully
resist the federal government's move for more competition, fearing
competition may move lower-cost in-state power to other metropolitan
areas and disrupt lower costs enjoyed by incumbent in-state stakeholders.7
Other states have enhanced competition through their own set of
additional state rules and orders. However, many states have embraced
regulatory mechanisms, which de jure or de facto promote intrastate
commerce in power and disadvantage interstate commerce! Screened
through the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, even when consistent
with some federal orders to promote greater competition, state rules are
now being ruled unconstitutional when they promote in-state interests by
discriminating with regard to the geographic origin of power.9
This article addresses the legal points of friction between contrary laws
at the state and federal levels, which conflict with regard to their promotion
of monopoly, or competition, in power. Section II sets up the foundation of
why electricity is different than every other item in U.S. commerce."0
Section III examines the key FERC orders mandating greater competition
in power pursuant to the Federal Power Act and the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution." Section III also analyzes key federal court decisions on
the preemption of power decisions for the second most important
invention of all time.12 On the flip side, Section III also examines two
recent federal court decisions against the exercise of federal authority over
5 See STEVEN FERREY, THE NEW RULES: A GUIDE TO ELECTRIC MARKET REGULATION
(Pennwell 2000) [hereinafter NEW RULES]; STEVEN FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER
(Thomson Reuters West, 34' Ed. 2014) [hereinafter INDEPENDENT POWER].
6 See infra Sections III. C.4, III.D.3.
'See infra Section III.C.6.
sSee infra Section IV.
9See infra Section V.
'o See infra Section II.
"See infra Section III.
12 Se infra Section III.
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power."s These federal court decisions weave an increasingly complex legal
backdrop for the future of power.
Section IV switches to the state regulatory arena to examine in detail
four types of state rules that are moving the power market to greater
competition.4 State authority is subject to judicial review when states have
dejure or de facto constructed a tilted regulatory platform which favors their
in-state power and industries, and discriminates against out-of-state
power." The U.S. Supreme Court declared that there is nothing more
fundamental in interstate commerce than electricity; all 48 contiguous
states import interstate power from outside.16 The Commerce Clause of
the Constititon prohibits states from regulating commerce in power based
on the place of origin of the power.
1 7
Section V analyzes key legal challenges that have been successful under
the dormant Commerce Clause against several state attempts to regulate
power.s Section VI evaluates the friction over competition between state
and federal authority, and charts the legal path forward.19 In a bifurcated
state-federal system of U.S. governance, introducing competition is not a
seamless regulatory fit or straightforward exercise.2" When states introduce
their own state laws and incentives to promote greater competition in
power, it only passes legal scrutiny if the states construct a level playing
field for all interstate commerce.2
Ultimately, there is more at stake here than abstract concepts of
competition: power is one of the most important inventions of all time and
the foundation of the American economy in the 21st Century.2 2 This article
navigates monoply, interstate commerce, and the friction in transition to
21st Century competition in power in America. It examines key federal and
state court decisions sculpting the limits of federal and state authority over
power.
The final section of this paper examines what makes power unique for
purposes of delivering it competitively compared to all other items of
" See infra Section III.E.
14 See infra Section IV.
sId.
16 FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,760-61 (1982).
17 Id. at 761-62.
's See infra Section V.
19 See infra Section VI.
20 Id.
21 See infra Section V.
22 Electricity is unique among inventions in that it facilitates the use of seven of the top 50
inventions of all time: The internet, computers, air-conditioning, radio, television, the telephone, and
semiconductors. Fallows, supra note 1.
78 KY.J. EQUINE, AGRIC. &NAT. RESOURCES L. [Vol. 8 No. 1
commerce in the U.S. economy. From this springboard, we plunge into the
expanding pool of competiton and regulation.
II. THE FUNCTION OF POWER AND CHANGES IN MONOPOLY
There has recently been a significant increase in competition in power
supply. This has not occurred in a vacuum, but rather through both federal
FERC orders at the wholesale level, and decisions in a number of states at
the retail level of power supply. The increase in competition is attributable
to several factors. One factor is the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
of 1978 ("PURPA"), which unleashed competitive small power and
cogeneration technologies.2 3 In addition, pursuant to its interstate and
wholesale jurisdiction, the FERC issued several orders,2 4 and some states
have initiated one or more competitive power initiatives.25
With a recent focus on climate change, there is a change in the electric
sector's role and the impacts of power usage. In 1949, only 11% of global
warming gases in the United States came from the electric sector; as of
2007, this sector is responsible for more than one-third of these gases.26
"The electric power sector, in comparison to transportation and other
sectors, offers the most cost-effective opportunities to reduce CO 2
emissions." 2 7 Technological changes also have been causative. The price of
small-scale modular solar photovoltaic (PV) technology has declined
dramatically, and states have adopted policies to facilitate the advancement
of more competitive generation distributed on-site, including PV power.2 8
The financial viability of more modular, on-site distributed generation
technologies, which can be owned and used by more persons at more
locations, changes the landscape. Changes in technology are resulting in
dramatic cost reductions for wind and solar photovoltaic distributed
generation.29 The cost to install photovoltaic solar panels has fallen
23 16 U.S.C. § 824, et seq.
24 See infra Section 11.
2 See infra Section IV.
26 See HistoricalData Series: TotalEnergy-Related Carbon Dioxide Emissions by End-Use Sector and
the Electric Power Sector, by Fuel Type, 1949-2007, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 1(2007),
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrptexceI/historicalco2.xls.
27 
Energy Estimates Show Rise in C02 Emissions, Offer Mitigation Options, CLEAN ENERGY REP.
(July 2, 2008), http://deanenergyreport.com/Energy-EW-Week/Energy-Washington-Week-
07/02/2008/energy-estimates-show-rise-in-co2-emissions-offer-mitigation-options/menu-id-
570.html.
2 
Residential Prosumers - Drivers and Policy Options (Re-Prosumers), INT'L ENERGY AGENCY,
June 2014, at 9.
29 Id. at 9.
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dramatically in recent years, lessening by about 60% in "hard" costs."0 PV
module prices have experienced a decline from approximately $1.90/watt in
2009 to $0.70/watt in 2013, and have lowered even further in some regions
of the world.3 See Figure 1.32 Prices for equipment, such as inverters,
which are required for the conversion process that transforms photovoltaic
direct current to alternating current, have also declined by more than 60%
in cost from $0.60-$1.00+/watt in 2005 to under $0.20/watt in 2013. 33 In
the United States, non-hardware "soft" costs for residential systems now
account for over 50% of total systems.34
Figure 1
Price of PV cells
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The decrease in the price of photovoltaic cells has allowed the solar
photovoltaic markets to grow at an average of more than 40% each year
since 2000.~ Since 2008, the price of photovoltaic panels has fallen by 75%,
'0See id.
31Id.
32id
33 id.
34 I-d. at 72.
3Id. at 10.
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while solar installations have multiplied by 1,000%.36 See Figure 2." In
2012, there were more than 300,000 "distributed" solar installations
throughout the United States, with those instillations taking place in
almost all 43 states that utilized net metering credits.3" By the end of 2013,
Americans had installed enough photovoltaic solar energy systems to raise
the country's total photovoltaic capacity to more than 12,000 megawatts.39 In
2013, two-thirds of solar installations in California were structured in a way
that allowed homeowners to lease the panels, rather than purchase them.40
Figure 2
U.S. Solar Development
C
CS',
36 Ker Than, As Solar Power Grows, Dispute Flares over U.S. Utility Bills, NATL GEOGRAPHIC
(Dec. 24,2013), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2013/12/131226-utilities-dispute-
net-metering-for-solar/.
" U.S. Dep't. of Energy, 2012 RENEWABLE ENERGY DATA BOOK, 64 (2012); INT'L ENERGY
AGENCY, supra note 28, at 11.
3 Than, supra note 36.
3Mike Munsell, U.S. Solar Market Grew 41%, Had Record Year in 2013, GREENTEcH MEDIA
(Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/u.s.-solar-market-grows-41 -has-
record-year-in-2013.
' Ronald Lehr, New Utility Business models. Utility and Regulatory Models fo r the New Era, 26
ELEC. J. 35, 40 (2013).
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The costs involved with renewable energy have declined significantly in
recent years, as there is distributed energy competition to conventional
power supply, and there is a push to make the grid "smarter."4 1 One
additional rooftop solar system was being installed every four minutes in
2013 in the United States.42 This technological change to more distributed
on-site power generation is not unprecedented.4 3 Before the use of large-
scale steam turbines, energy requirements were met through on-site
generation.44 An on-site distributed generation system does not encounter
large system electricity losses because the electricity travels a short distance
on-site, unless it is exported to the grid.45 Also, states have adopted policies
to facilitate more on-site distributed competitive generation. "As a result of
these trends, PV could act as a disruptive technology that challenges the
incumbent players in its industry. Many analysts have forecasted that the
centralized utility model that has served most of the world for over 100
years could give way to new business operating paradigms."
46
Much of the innovation responsible for the solar industry's explosive
growth has been financial rather than technological.47 For example, half the
United States' solar capacity was installed in 2012.48 Driving those sales
were the many homeowners who opted to install solar systems through a
monthly lease that often was cheaper than what they would pay for local
utilities.49 Currently, between 75% and 90% of all solar systems are now
leased as a result.5 0
Wind power also enjoyed a substantial increase.5 1 See Figure 3.52 In
2012, wind energy was the most deployed new U.S. electricity generation
41 Id.
42 Stephen Lacey,A Solar System Is Installed in the US Every 4 Minutes, GREENTECH MEDIA
(Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.greentechmedia.com/artides/read/america-installs-a-solar-system-every-
four-minutes.
41 THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF DISTRIBUTED GENERATION AND RATE-RELATED ISSUES
THAT MAY IMPEDE THEIR EXPANSION, U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY (2007).
4 Id.
41 See Shannon Baker-Branstetter, Distributed Renewable Generation: The Trifecta of Energy
Solutions to Curb Carbon Emissions, Reduce Pollutants, and Empower Ratepayers, 22 VILL. ENVTL. L.J.
1,3(2011).
1NTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 28, at 12.47
Todd Woody, The Next Big Innovation in Renewable Energy Won't Be Technological,
THEATLANTIC.cOM (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/1 1/the-
next-big-innovation-in-renewable-energy-wont-be-technological/281345/.
48 Id.
491d.
50 Id.
51 U.S. WindEnergy Production and Manufacturing Reaches Record Heights, U.S. DEP'T. OF
ENERGY (Aug. 6, 2013), http://energy.gov/articles/energy-dept-reports-us-wind-energy-production-
and-manufacturing-reaches-record-highs.
" U.S. Dep't. of Energy, 2012 RENEWABLE ENERGY DATA BOOK, 54 (2012).
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capacity, contributing to 43% of all new electric generation.3 The U.S.
Energy Information Administration projects that that U.S. wind power
capacity will total more than 77 GW at the end of 2015, constituting 4.6%
of total U.S. electricity generation.14 Since 1999, the Pacific Northwest has
had installed more than 7,000 MW of additional wind generating
capacity,"5 which is expected to increase to 14,000 MW by 2020.6 The U.S.
Department of Energy calculated that approximately 20% of wind power
could be accommodated on the grid, which is about the amount of back-up
reserve margin in regional power systems, without requiring additional
storage or other mechanisms to accommodate intermittency.5
7
3 id.
54 See Short-Term Energy and Winter Fuels Outlook, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Oct. 6,2015),
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/report/renew-co2.cfm.
05 OS-14 - Oversupply Rate Proceeding, BPA.GOV,
http://www.bpa.gov/Finance/RateCases/OS-14RateProceeding/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Oct.
18,2015).
6 Michael Dotten, Integrating Wind Energy into Power Planning: Lessonsfrom the Pacific
Northwest, MARTIN LAW (July 21,2011), http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20110721-wind-
energy-power-planning.
"7J. DeCesaro et al., Wind Energy and Power System Operations: A Review of Wind Integration
Studies to Date, ELEC.J. 34 (Dec. 2009). Wind, being at off-peak times in many locations, will tend to
displace typical coal base-load power, while solar PV units will tend to displace typical on-peak gas-
fired peaking generation units.
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Figure 3
SU.S. Wind Development
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ill. FEDERALLAWANDREGULATION: GREATERCOMPEITFIONIN POWER
Federal policy has promoted competition in electric generation. At the
federal level of regulation, § 205 of the Federal Power Act prohibits
utilities from granting any "undue preference or advantage to any person
or... maintain[ing] any unreasonable difference in rates ... either as
between localities or as between classes of service."8 The Federal Power Act
prohibits terms of service that are unreasonable or unduly preferential as
between different classes of customers.5 9 The FERC can change a rate or rule
it finds unreasonable:6" "Following a hearing, [FERC] may set aside any
rate found 'unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential,'
and replace it with a just and reasonable rate." 61
Utility rates are designed to recover the cost of each commodity and
service provided. Traditionally, both the FERC and state regulators
ss 16 U.S.C. § 824d(b) (2012).
59 Id.
' 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a).
61 NRG Power Mktg., L.L.C. v. Me. Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 558 U.S. 165,171(2010).
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assigned only costs that were "just and reasonable" to those who would
benefit from the utility investment.62 Moving electrons follow the law of
electro-physics, not 'contract paths.' 63 Therefore, determining who is
benefited is more difficult with a larger number of smaller and more diverse
independent and distributed generation sources. In an editorial, The Wall
Street Journal accused the FERC of "socializing transmissions costs
nationwide" in a manner that is " insidious, and arguably
unconstitutional."
64
A. PURPA and Distributed Competitive Generation
Since 1978, the primary incentive for competitive renewable power
development has been the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978
(PURPA), which is "designed to combat the nationwide energy crisis.'65
Even though PURPA was somewhat restricted by changes in federal law in
2005, its requirement that regulated retail utilities purchase renewable
power from competitive Qualifying Facilities (QFs), remains a primary
incentive for competitive renewable power development.66 Under PURPA,
if a power generation project satisfies specified legal requirements, it is
characterized as a QF and is entitled to regulatory benefits.67 A QF
"produces electric energy solely by the use of biomass, waste, renewable
resources, geothermal resources or any combination thereof and is not
greater in gross capacity than eighty megawatts unless it also cogenerates
power."6' The Energy Policy Act of 200569 added § 210(m) to PURPA,
which permits the termination of an electric utility's obligation to purchase
energy from QFs if the FERC finds that the QF has nondiscriminatory
access to wholesale electric markets.7 °
62 Is FERC Really 'Socializing' Transmission Costs?, 24 ELEC.J. 1, 5 (March 2011).
63id.
64Esther Whieldon, Wellinghoff Blasts Paper's Mischaracterization of Transmission Cost Rule; Calls
It 'Very Troubling, ELEC. UTIL.WEEK (Nov. 15,2010) at 11.
65 FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 745 (1982).
66 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2006).
67 Steven Ferrey, Exit Strategy: State LegalDiscretion to Environmentally Sculpt the Deregulated
Electric Environment, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 109, 136-42 (2002).
65 16 U.S.C. § 796 (2015).
69 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1253 (119 Stat. 594) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §
824a-3 (2006)).
70 16 U.S.C. § 210(m)(1). PURPA 210(m)(1) sets out the following criteria for non-
discriminatory markets:
(A)(i) independently administered, auction-based ay ahead and real time wholesale
markets for the sale of electric energy, and (ii) wholesale markets for long term sales of
capacity and electric energy; or
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In an effort to reduce United States consumption of fossil fuels and
reliance on foreign energy supplies, Congress sought to promote the
development of alternative energy sources, including cogeneration and
independent small power production.71 Prior to PURPA, an independent
cogenerator or small power producer seeking to interconnect with an
electric utility faced at least three primary obstacles: 
72
° Some utilities used their monopoly power to refuse to
purchase electric power generated by independent
competitive sources, and refused to interconnect with
the facility, or offered the QF inadequate prices for a
power purchase.73
* "[S]ome utilities charged those entities that
cogenerated discriminatory rates for supplementary,
back-up, and maintenance service."74
* "[F]ederal and state laws posed a problem for an
interconnected cogenerator or small power producer
[QF] in that it could subject itself to plenary public
utility regulation, under either the Federal Power Act
and/or the Public Utility Holding Company Act.""
The purpose of Congress in enacting PURPA § 210 was to eliminate
these obstacles.6
Electric utilities must offer to sell necessary backup,77 interruptible,78
maintenance,7 9 or supplemental8  power to QFs. PURPA requires that
(B)(i) transmission and interconnection services that are provided by a Commission-
approved regional transmission entity and administered pursuant to an open access
transmission tariffthat affords nondiscriminatory treatment to all customers; and (iii)
competitive wholesale markets that provide a meaningful opportunity to sell capacity,
including long-term and short-term and real-time sales to buyers other than the utility to
which the qualifying facility is interconnected. In determining whether a meaningful
opportunity to sell exists, the commission shall consider, among other factors, evidence of
transactions within the relevant market; or
(C) wholesale markets for the sale of capacity and electric energy that are, at a
minimum, of comparable competitive quality as markets described in subparagraphs (A) and
(B).
71 See Ferrey, sup ra note 67, at 129-33.
72 See Steven Ferrey, Nothing But Net: Renewable Energy and the Environment, Midmerica Legal
Fictions, and Supremacy Doctrine, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1 (2003).
" Steven R. Miles, Full-Avoided Cost Pricing Under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act: "Just
and Reasonable" to Electric Consumers?, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1267, 1267 (1984).
74 d.
75 ld.
76 Id. at 1268-69.
77 See 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(9) (2015) (Stating that back-up power is electric energy or capacity
during an unscheduled outage to supply power and is generally self-generated).
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such power sales by an electric utility to a QF be nondiscriminatory as well
as "just and reasonable and in the public interest."'" PURPA specifies that
the rates established by the FERC for these purchases may not exceed the
"incremental cost" to the utility of purchasing alternative electric energy,
the "avoided cost," defined as the cost to the electric utility of the electric
energy which, but for the purchase from such QF, such utility would
generate or purchase from another source.
82
B. Federal Tax Incentives
Federal tax policies also support independent competitive entities
producing power. This has been done through tax credits and accelerated
depreciation.
The PTC [Federal Production Tax Credit] began in 1992
as an effort to subsidize wind generation development and
jump-start the wind industry, offering a subsidy for each
kilowatt-hour (kWh) of electricity produced for a plant's
first 10 years of operation . . . Starting at 1.5 cents/kWh
($15/MWh), the PTC increased each year with the
inflation rate. Before its expiration at the end of 2013, the
PTC stood at 2.4 cents/kWh ($24/MWh). On a pre-tax
basis, that is equivalent to a subsidy of $35/MWh, greater
than the average price of electricity in many wholesale
markets in 2013.83
"A five-year extension of the production tax credit for wind and other
renewable energy sources would cost more than $18.5 billion, according to
a Joint Committee on Taxation analysis released by a House Oversight and
Government Reform subcommittee."84 There is nothing atypical about tax
78 See 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(10) (2015) (Stating that interruptible power is power or capacity
supplied by an electric utility to a QF subject to interruption under specific conditions).
79 See 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(11) (2015) (Stating that maintenance power is power or capacity
supplied by an electric utility to a QF during periods of scheduled outages).
w See 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(8) (2015) (Stating that supplementary power is power or capacity
supplied by an electric utility to a WF to augment self-generated electricity).
s' 18 C.F.R. § 292.305(a).
Plymouth Rock Energy Assocs. v. Dep't. of Pub. Utils., 648 N.E.2d 752, 754 (1995).
13 Jonathan A. Lesser, Wind Power Subsidies: Today, Tomorrow, Forever?, PUB. UTIL.
FORTNIGHTLY (July 2014), http://www.fortnighdy.com/fortnightly/2014/07/wind-power-subsidies.
SAri Natter, 5-Year Extension of Renewable Energy Tax Credit Could Cost $18.5 Billion,
BLOOMBERG BNA ENERGY & CLIMATE REPORT (Oct. 2, 2013) (finding that the analysis also
estimated that one-year extension of the 2.3 cent per kilowatt hour tax credit would cost nearly S6.2
billion over a 10-year period).
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incentives. World governments subsidize gasoline, electricity and other
energy in the amount of $1.9 trillion a year.8
5
The predominate direction of U.S. federal tax incentives has shifted
recently from underwriting coal to supporting renewable power, which can
be developed at a smaller, more independent modular individual scale.6
The value of federal tax support for the energy sector was estimated to be
$20 billion in 2010 and $24.2 billion in 2012."v Of this, approximately one-
third ($6.3 billion) was given for tax incentives for the use of renewable
fuels."8 "Another $6.7 billion can be attributed to tax-related incentives
supporting various renewable energy technologies,"8 9 and targeted tax
incentives for the use of fossil energy resources amounted to $2.4 billion.9 °
"In 2010, nearly half of the tax incentives for renewables benefitted
biofuels,"91 and "from 2009 onwards, the increased costs associated with
incentives for renewable electricity are largely attributable to the Section
1603 grants in lieu of tax credit program."92
Figure 4 displays the cost of tax incentives for various fossil fuels and
renewable technologies over an almost forty-year period, ending in fiscal
year 2015. A recent shift towards offering incentives for renewable power is
visible, first occurring during the Bush Administration in 2008.
"s See Press Release No. 13/93, Intl Monetary Fund, IMF Callsfor GlobalReform of Energy
Subsidies: Sees Major Gainsfor Economic Growtb and the Environment (Mar. 27, 2013), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2013/pr1393.htm; see also Howard Schneider, IMF, Citing
$1.9 Trillion in Government Subsidies, Calls for Endto Energy Mispricing, WASH. POST (Mar. 27,
2013).
, I.R.C. § 162 (West 2015).
87 MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41953, ENERGYTAx INCENTIVES:
MEASURING VALUE ACROSS DIFFERENT TYPES OF ENERGY RESOURCES 6 (2015).
" Id. at 7-8 tbl.2.
s9Id.
90 Id.
" Id. at 10 ("Of the estimated $23.3 billion in energy tax provisions in 2013, an estimated $1.6
billion, or 6.9%, went toward supporting biofuels").
92 Id. ("The Section 1603 grant option is not available for projects that began construction after
December 31, 2011. However, since grants are paid out when construction is completed and eligible
property is placed in service, outlays under the Section 1603 program are expected to continue through
2017. Outlays under the section 1603 grant program are projected to [be $4.1 billion for FY2012]."
Under current law, wind property must be placed in service prior to the end of the calendar year 2012 to
qualify for the Section 1603 grant. To qualify for the grant, eligible biomass, geothermal energy, landfill
gas, trash, hydropower, and marine and hydrokinetic property must be placed in service by the end of
2013).
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Figure 4. ProjectedAnnual Cost ofEnergy-Related Tax Incentives
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Fiscal year1977- fiscal year 2015
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Table 1 displays the estimated revenue cost of various federal energy
tax incentives in recent years.94 Renewable energy, which can be
independently and competitively developed, has dominated fossil fuel tax
incentives for the past five years.95 The analysis presented in these tables
highlights only energy subsidies provided through the tax code, and does
not examine direct or indirect energy subsidies.96 Although 44.9% of
generation in 2010 can be attributed to coal, coal received an estimated
10% of tax incentives.
97
9
3 
Id. at 11.
94 Id. at 7 (displaying Joint Committee on Taxation and Department of the Treasury data).
95 Id.
96 Id. at 14 (contrasting U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA) studies, this includes Section
1603 grants in the place of tax credits as a tax-related provision. The EIA lists the Section 1603 grants
in place "of tax credits as a direct expenditure.").
9 Id. (comparing similarity of data to the EIA's data for 2007, "where 47.6% of generation was
attributable to coal, while coal received 12.7% of the total federal financial support for electricity
production."); see also id. at 8.
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Table 1 j* Estimated Revenue Cost ofEnergy Tax Provisions: Fiscal Years
2010 through 2012
(Dollar value in billions)
Provision 2010 2011 2012
Fossil Fuels
Expensing of Exploration and Development 0.7 0.8 0.8
Costs for Oil and Gas
Percentage Depletion for Oil and Gas 0.5 0.9 0.9
Amortization of Geological and Geophysical 0.1 0.1 0.1
Costs for Oil and Gas Exploration
Fifteen-year Depreciation for Natural Gas 0.1 0.1 0.1
Distribution Lines
Election to Expense fifty percent of Qualified 0.7 0.8 0.7
Refinery Costs
Amortization of Air Pollution Control 0.1 0.2 0.2
Facilities
Credits for Investments in Clean Coal 0.2 0.2 0.2
Facilities
Excise Tax Credits for Alternative Fuel N/A 99  0.2 0.2
Mixtures
9sId. at 6-7 tbl.2.
99Id. at 8 tbl.2 ( "An n.a. indicates that the provision was not listed in the 2010 tax expenditure
tables.").
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Provision 2010 2011 2012
Subtotal, Fossil Fuels 2.4 3.3 3.2
Renewables
Production Tax Credit (PTC) 1.4 1.4 1.6
Investment Tax Credit (ITC) (i000  0.5 0.5
Accelerated Depreciation for Renewable 0.3 0.3 0.3
Energy Property
Table 2 summarizes and contrasts energy production and energy tax
incentives.1" 1 The analysis presented in these tables highlights only energy
subsidies provided through the tax code, and does not examine direct or
indirect energy subsidies.
10 2
Table 2. Comparing Energy Production and Energy Tax Incentives: Fossil
Fuels and Renewables, 2010
Production Tax
Incentives
Quadrillio Dolla Billion Dolla
n r s of r
Btu % of Dollar % of
Total s Total
Fossil Fuels 58.5 78.0% $2.4 12.6%
Renewables 8.1 10.7% $13.0 68.1%
Power
Renewables 5.6 7.4% $13.0 68.1%
(excluding hydro-
electric)
Renewables 6.2 8.3% $6.7 35.1%
(excluding
o Id. ("(i) indicates a positive estimated revenue loss of less than $50 million.").
"01 Id. at 7-8 tbl.2.
1"2 Id. at 14 (including, in contrast to U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA) studies, Section
1603 grants in the place of tax credits as a tax-related provision. The EIA lists the Section 1603 grants
in place "of tax credits as a direct expenditure.").
'03 Id. at 8-9 tbl.3.
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biofuels and
related tax
incentives)
Renewables 3.7 4.9% $6.7 35.1%
(excluding
hydro-electric
and biofuels and
related tax
incentives)
Table 3 presents subsidies to electricity production by fuel type.
104
Again, as of 2010 date, fossil fuels receive a much smaller percentage
allocation than their share of electric production.10 5 Correspondingly,
renewable sources, often competitively and independently developed,
receive a much larger portion than their share of electric production."6
Table 3. Subsidies to Electricity Production by Fuel Type, 2010
(Dollar values in millions)
Production Federal Financial
Incentives
FY201
0 Net
Generatio Tax Other
Fuel Type n % of Subsidie Subsidie % of
(billion Tota s s Tota
kWh) 1 1
Coal 1,851 44.9 486 703 10.0
Natural Gas 1,030 25.0 583 72 5.5%
and Petroleum %
Liquids
Nuclear 807 19.6 908 1,591 21.0
Renewables 425 10.3 1,347 5,212 55.3
% %
" Id. at 15 tbl.4 (showing data from the EIA).
105 See id.
106 id.
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Biomass 57 1.4% 54 61 1.0%
Geotherma 16 0.4% 1 199 1.7%
1 
Hydropow 257 6.2% 17 198 1.8%
er
Solar 1 0.0% 99 869 8.2%
Wind 95 2.3% 1,178 3,808 42.0
Transmission (i) (i 58 924 8.2%
and )
Distribution
Total 4,091 100 3,38 8,50 100
%_ 2 2 %
In the past seven years, there have been substantial U.S. federal tax
incentives for renewable energy development.10 7 The fossil fuels-related tax
incentives are estimated by the Congressional Research Service to reduce
federal tax revenues by $20.6 billion between 2013 and 2017; during the
same period "the total cost of tax-related provisions supporting the
production of renewable energy (tax expenditures and grants designed to
replace tax expenditures) is estimated to be $39.6 billion." ' However, the
states have put forth significant efforts to promote competitive, often
independent, renewable energy.
09
C. Federal Energy Orders Mandate Greater Competition
Over two decades, the FERC has promulgated new rules promoting
competition in wholesale markets and power transmission. The FERC has
no authority "over facilities used for the generation of electric energy or over
facilities used in local distribution or only for the transmission of electric
107Id.
105 MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43206, ENERGYTAX POLICY: ISSUES
INTHE 113TH CONGRESS, 14-15 (2013) ("Of this total [for renewable energy], $17.2 billion is for
outlays under the Section 1603 grants in lieu of tax credits program. Thus, the cost of tax expenditure
and excise tax incentives for renewables is estimated to be $22.4 billion between 2013 and 2017.
Historically, the primary tax incentive for renewable electricity has been the production tax credit
(PTC). The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act... substantially modified this incentive,
allowing projects eligible for the renewable PTC or investment tax credit (ITC) to claim a one-time
grant in lieu of the tax credits.").
109 See infra pp. 44-52.
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energy in intrastate commerce. " "' Below, five key competitive initiatives of
the FERC, upheld by the federal courts, are highlighted.
1. FERC Order 888: Competition in Power Transmission
In Order No. 888,11 the Commission established the foundation for
the development of competitive bulk power markets: non-discriminatory
open access transmission service by electric utilities.' All regulated public
utilities that own, control, or operate jurisdictional transmission facilities
are required by FERC Order 888 to have open access transmission
tariffs.113 The purpose is to eliminate undue discrimination/preference in
moving power and promote competition."' An individual tariff must track
the FERC-mandated pro forma open access transmission tariff, unless a
waiver has been granted by the FERC.1"' The proforma tariff requires that
the transmission provider plan and construct additional transmission
facilities so as to be able to serve network customers "on a basis comparable
to the Transmission Provider's delivery of its own generating and
purchased resources to its Native Load Customers."
1 6
In FERC Order 888, the FERC imposed requirements on regulated
utilities to (1) separate transmissions from wholesale power functions and
(2) take transmissions under an open access transmission tariff ("OATT")
on a nondiscriminatory basis."7 The FERC promulgated a revised pro
forma OATT in Order 888-A, providing an incumbent customer with a
right of first refusal (ROFR) to match the duration offered by a new
customer at a full OATT rate."8
110 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2015).
"'. Order No. 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540,21,552 (May 10,1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R.
pt. 35,385).
112 Id.
11318 C.F.R. § 35.28(a), (c) (2015).
14 Order No. 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,718.
115 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(c), (v) (2015).
1' Order No. 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,718.
117 Order No. 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting
Utilities, 75 F.E.R.C. 61,080, at 61,238 (1996).
n. Idaho Power Co. v. FERC, 312 F.3d 454,457 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (reversing the FERC Order
forcing Idaho Power Co. to continue to supply power to an incumbent customer at the end of its
contract term even though a merchant customer had offered a more attractive contract term) (holding
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While the FERC encouraged joint planning with customers and other
utilities, and also regional planning, the FERC did not mandate such
planning.19 Not just third-party customers, but the public utilities
themselves, and their subsidiaries, must take transmission service pursuant
to this uniform tariff. Non-public utilities may have "reciprocity" open
access transmission tariffs.12 °
2. FERC Order No. 890: Elimination ofDiscrimination and Preference
In Order 890,121 the Commission amended the Order 888 pro forma
tariff to require transmission providers to plan for the needs of their
customers on a basis comparable to planning for their own needs.'22 FERC
Orders 890 and 890-A sought to make improvements to its pro forma open
access transmission tariff, and better achieve the goal of eliminating undue
discrimination/preference in transmission service. The Commission
deemed it critical that transmission providers improve their transmission
planning processes to remedy the potential for undue discrimination, and
to facilitate a more transparent and coordinated process open to customers,
competitors, and state regulators. To better ensure that planning and
construction occur in a non-unduly discriminatory and competitive
manner, Orders 890 and 890-A mandated coordinated, open, and
transparent ransmission planning on a local and regional level.23 In Order
that an incumbent must match a new potential customer's superior offer, interpreting right of first
refusal as a right to match the terms of a third party's highest offer).
... Order No. 890, Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service,
72 Fed. Reg. 12,266, 12,317 (Mar. 15, 2007) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35,385).
12018 C.F.R. § 35.28(a), (e) (2015) (specifying that "Reciprocity" provides a so-called safe harbor,
ensuring that the non-public utility is entitled to transmission service from public entities).
121 Order No. 890, Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service,
72 Fed. Reg. at 12,266.
12 N.Y. Reg'l Interconnect, Inc. v. FERC, 634 F.3d 581,584 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Order No. 890,
Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, 72 Fed. Reg. at 12,320.
12 FERC explained that in light of a decline in investment relative to load growth resulting in
increased congestion and a reduced access to alternative sources of energy, as well as a disincentive to
remedy congestion on a non-unduly discriminatory basis, reform of the Order No. 888 and 888-A pro
forma tariffwas needed. In Order No. 890-A, the Commission explained:
The Commission identified nine planning principles in Order No. 890
that must be satisfied for a transmission provider's planning process to be
considered compliant with that order. These nine planning principles are:
(1) Coordination-the process for consulting with transmission customers
and neighboring transmission providers;
(2) Openness-planning meetings must be open to all affected parties;
(3) Transparency-access must be provided to the methodology, criteria,
and processes used to develop transmission plans;
(4) Information Exchange-the obligations of and methods for customers
to submit data to transmission providers must be described;
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2000,124 the Commission encouraged the development of Regional
Transmission Organizations to form "competitive wholesale electric
markets"12 which were required to incorporate non-discriminatory
transmission service.
126
3. FERC Order 719: Efficiency Competes with Power Generation
To encourage more fair competition for demand-response measures
competing with power generation, in Orders 719 and 719-A, the FERC
adopted changes in demand-response and use of market pricing to elicit
demand response during periods of operating reserve shortages, long-term
power contracting, market monitoring, and responsiveness of the
organized wholesale electric markets to their customers and other
stakeholders.127
4. FERC Order 764: Scheduling Intermittent Renewable Power
New intermittent wind and solar renewable resources cannot reliably
supply base load power, as they demonstrate a relatively low availability
factor in the 10-40% range of hours during a week or month.2 8 Wind
generators have plant effective capacity factors of 40-43% on average.29
Under FERC Order 888, generators who needed access to transmission
(5) Comparability-transmission plans must meet the specific service
requests of transmission customers and otherwise treat similarly-situated
customers (e.g., network and retail native load) comparably in transmission
system planning,
(6) Dispute Resolution-an alternative dispute resolution process to
address both procedural and substantive planning issues must be included;
(7) Regional Participation-there must be a process for coordinating with
interconnected systems;
(8) Economic Planning Studies-study procedures must be provided for
economic upgrades to address congestion or the integration of new resources,
both locally and regionally; and
(9) Cost Allocation-a process must be included for allocating costs of new
facilities that do not fit under existing rate structures, such as regional projects.
Order No. 890-A, Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, 121
F.E.R.C. 61,297 (2007).
124 Guidance on Regional Transmission Organization and Independent System Operator Filing
Requirements under the Federal PowerAct, 104 F.E.R.C. 61,248 (2003).
12' Me. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. FERC, 454 F.3d 278, 280-81 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
126 See 18 C.F.R. § 35.34(k)(7) (2015).
127 18 C.F.R. part 35.
12s See INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 5, § 2:11 (noting inability of intermittent sources to
serve as base-load resource).
129 Zachary Shahan, Wind Turbine Net Capacity Factor- 50% the New Normal?, CLEAN
TECHNICA (July 27, 2012), www.deantechnica.com/2012/07/27/wind-turbine-net-capacity-factor-
50-the-new-normal/.
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additions had to pre-fund those additions subject to reimbursement by
those transmission customers who later used the new facilities, which were
typically utilities, pursuant to Open Access Transmission Tariffs filed by
transmission providers."' Generators had to pay the peak level of
transmission required to carry the generator's load.
Prior to FERC Order 764, hourly scheduling of resources for
transmission service was the norm. Wind generators had difficulty meeting
hourly schedules because of significant variations in generation output
within an hour time period, which resulted from wind velocity changes."'
In its Order 764, the FERC required that every transmission customer
be given the ability to adjust its schedule at 15-minute intervals to reflect
changing conditions.32 The FERC now treats transmission systems as
integrated networks with widely dispersed benefits. In amending 18 CFR
Part 35 in Order No. 764,133 the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
concluded: "[cihanges in the generation mix and underlying public policies
influencing investment in VER generation have accentuated the need to
reform existing practices that unduly discriminate against VERs or
otherwise impair the ability of public utility transmission providers and
their customers to manage costs associated with VER integration
effectively." FERC Order 764 requires that interconnecting DG
generators pay for any incremental generation required, subject to
reimbursement for generators who later interconnect to the increased
transmission capacity. This promotes competition by supporting
intermittent independent wind and solar technologies.
Techniques that would integrate large amounts of variable generation
into the power system " include faster generator dispatch and
scheduling,13 and larger load balancing areas.36 Most transmission
130 See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and
Transmitting Utilities, 75 F.E.R.C. 61,080 (1996); see also 78 F.E.R.C. 61,220 (1997), 81 F.E.R.C.
61,248 (1997), 82 F.E.R.C. 61,046 (1998).
"' Michael Dotten, New Developments Integrating Wind and Solar Power into the Power Grid,
MARTEN LAW (Apr. 14,2014), http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20140415-integrating-wind-
solar-power-grid ("[W]ind generators' plant factors on [the Bonneville Power Administration] system
averaged 27.1%, but the generator, under the old standards, had to pay the peak level of transmission
required to carry the generator's load.").
132 Order No. 764, 18 CFR Part 35 Integration of Variable Energy Resources, 139 F.E.R.C.
61,246,2012 FERC LEXIS 1160, 4 (2012).
133 Id. at *24.
131 See M. Milligan & B. Kirby, Impact of Balancing Areas Size, Obligation Sharing, and Ramping
Capability on WindIntegration 38-39 (Nat'l Renewable Energy Lab., Conference Paper No.
NREL/CP-500-41809, 2007), availableat http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fyO7osti/41809.pdf.
'3s ENERNEX CORP., AVISTA CORPORATION WIND INTEGRATION STUDY (March 2007),
available at http://www.uwig.org/avistawindintegrationstudy.pdf (finding that sub-hourly scheduling
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providers with significant amounts of wind energy on their systems
conduct a centralized wind energy forecast. MISO, PJM, ERCOT,
NYISO, and CAISO have implemented centralized wind energy
forecasting, as has Southern California Edison.
13 7
5. FERC Order 1000: Transmission Rights of First Refusal
The FERC approves all RTO and Independent System Operator
(ISO) terms of service and all financial tariffs.13 s FERC Order No. 1000
creates obligations for transmission owners to engage in regional and
interregional transmission planning.139 FERC Order 1000 requires
incumbent transmission providers, utilities, and the RTOs which manage
regional multi-state transmission access to the grid, to remove rights-of-
first-refusal (ROFRs) from FERC-approved transmission tariffs.140 The
FERC found that Order 1000 reforms were required to reflect new
industry developments and "to address remaining deficiencies in
transmission, planning, and cost allocation processes so that the
transmission grid can better support wholesale power markets .... 141
To promulgate greater competition in ownership of traditionally
monopolized transmission facilities, FERC Order 1000 requires
incumbent transmission providers to remove rights of first refusal from
Commission-approved tariffs.142 The FERC noted that a non-incumbent
transmission developer might lose the opportunity to construct its
proposed transmission project to the incumbent transmission owner under
would greatly reduce variable energy resources (VER) integration costs and faster (sub-hourly) power
system dispatch and scheduling would allow system operators to more quickly and efficiently respond to
power system output variations. The study similarly found that wind integration costs would be reduced
by 40-60 percent by moving from hourly to sub-hourly dispatch intervals).
'36 Statement, Integrating Renewable Resources Into The Wholesale Electric Grid, FERC
Docket No. AD09-4-000 (Mar. 2, 2009) (arguing for greater cooperation or even consolidation among
the roughly 125 existing balancing areas, as variable energy integration costs are greatly reduced if wind
resources are geographically diverse as opposed to being concentrated in a small area and developing
regional load following and ancillary services markets would also alleviate an individual balancing area's
burden to provide all ancillary services from its own resources).
" 7 Audun Botterud &Jianhui Wang, Wind Power Forecasting in U.S. Electricity Markets,
23 ELEC. J. 71, 75-76 (April 2010).
138 NEW RULES, supra note 5, at 49-50.
'39 Order No. 1000, 18 CFR Part 35 Transmission Planning and CostAllocation by Transmission
Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 136 F.E.R.C. 61,051 (2011); see also Rishi Garg, What's Best
for the States:A Federally Imposed Competitive Solicitation Model or a Prcferencefor the Incumbent? State
Adoption ofRigbt of First Refusal Statutes in Response to FERC Order 1000 and the Dormant Commerce
Clause (Natl Regulatory Research Inst., Briefing Paper No. 13-04, Apr. 2013) available at
http://www.illinoisjltp.com/sources/Ferrey/115 Rishi%2OGarg,%20%20Whats%2OBest%20f.pdf.
140 Id.
141 Id. 99.
1
42
1d. 1227.
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a federal ROFR to construct any transmission facility in its service
territory.43 The FERC's authority applies to public utility transmission
provider tariffs and agreements subject to FERC jurisdiction.
144
The FERC stated that nothing in Order 1000 is intended to limit or
affect state or local laws or regulations with respect to the construction of
transmission development.4 5 The FERC lacks jurisdiction over the siting,
construction, and ownership of transmission facilities, which are
exclusively within state jurisdiction.146 FERC case law exerts exclusive
jurisdiction over the "transmission of electric energy in interstate
commerce," and over "all facilities for such transmission or sale of electric
energy."
147
On appeal in 2014, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously
rejected challenges to FERC's Order 1000 as "unpersuasive," in response
to allegations that the order would harm system reliability. 141 Petitioners
argued that the FERC unlawfully deprived them of their rights of first
refusal without first making the finding required by law to rebut the
Mobile-Sierra presumption,'149 which presumes that freely negotiated
wholesale energy contracts are "just and reasonable" unless found by the
FERC to seriously harm the public interest.5 ' The court disagreed, noting
that the FERC would hear the petitioners' Mobile-Sierra arguments when
it reviewed the actual tariffs, the filing of which are required to comply with
Order 10002"5l The court declared that the FERC properly addressed
reliability concerns by maintaining ROFRs for projects that would be
located entirely within a utility's service territory, and thus would not be
subject to regional cost allocation.5 2 The court held that the FERC had
sufficient authority under § 206 of the Federal Power Act to require
removal of federal rights-of-first-refusal provisions from federally
mandated transmission tariffs "upon determining they were unjust and
" 3Notice of Request for Comments, Transmission Planning Processes Under Order No. 890,
Docket No. AD09-8-000, at 12 (Oct. 8,2009).
T See Order No. 1000, supra note 139, 287.
145 Id. (pertaining only to Commission-jurisdictional tariffs or agreements and does not require
removal of references to such state or local laws or regulations from Commission-approved tariffs or
agreements).
4 Piedmont Envd. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 2009).
147 Steven Ferrey, The Double Helix of Supremacy and Commerce Clause Constitutional Restraints
Encircling the New Energy Frontier, 7 NW. INTERDISC. L. REV. 1, 17 (2014) (citing 16 USC §§ 824(a)-
(b)(1)).
,4, S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41,48 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
'4 9 Id. at 81.
0 Id. at 76.
's Id. at 81.
112 Id. at 48.
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unreasonable practices affecting rates."153
The challengers claimed that there was only a tenuous relationship, or
"affect," between the incumbent utilities' monopolies and resultant rates.154
As a result, the FERC lacked authority to remove ROFRs under
§ 206, which limits the FERC's authority to practices "affecting" a rate.'
The court found the petitioners' argument "unconvincing," concluding
that § 206 does not "unambiguously" limit the commission's authority,
further stating "[w]e think that the commission's reading of § 206 is
reasonable. Petitioners give us no persuasive reason to think otherwise....
The challenged orders take great pains to avoid intrusion on the traditional
role of the states."15 6
The circuit court rejected challenges that the FERC's ROFR removal
requirement violated the Mobile-Sierra doctrine.157 The court found that
the FERC could require transmission providers to participate in regional
planning, which allocates costs of new transmission facilities
proportionately based on forecasted benefits.' The court also found there
was "substantial evidence of a theoretical threat to support adoption of the
reforms" in Order 1000.159
Despite upholding FERC 1000, the competition it creates has yielded
interesting results when implemented by the states pursuant to federal
order. The transmission system within the Electric Reliability Council of
Texas (ERCOT) is isolated from any interstate commerce and is therefore
"s Id. at 48-49.
's
4 
Id. at 74.
155 id.
116 Id. at 76.
117 Id. at 74-75 ("The relationship between rights of first refusal and rates is far more direct than
the relationship between corporate governance and rates. Nothing suggests that replacing the members
of a board will necessarily affect rates... The challenged orders here provide what was lacking in
CAISO: an economic principle that directly ties the practice the Commission sought to regulate to
rates." (citation omitted)).
"' Id. at 48. FERC Order 890 requires the development of mandatory regional cost allocation
rules by which the beneficiaries of transmission projects throughout the region are identified and
required to pay for the cost of the expansion in a manner roughly commensurate with the benefits. The
commission justified Order 1000 on the "theoretical threat" that "the narrow focus of current planning
requirements and shortcomings of current cost allocation practices create an environment that fails to
promote the more efficient and cost-effective development of new transmission facilities" Id. at 64.
FERC "reasonably determined that regional planning must include consideration of transmission
needs driven by public-policy requirements [and] ... reasonably relied upon the reciprocity condition to
encourage non-public utility transmission providers to participate in a regional planning process. Id. at
49.... [E]ven in a naturally monopolistic market the threat of competitive entry (e.g., through
competitive bidding) will lead firms to lower their costs, which thereby generally lowers cost-based
utility rates." Id. at 69.
159 Id.
2015-2016]
KY.J. EQUINE, AGRIC. &NAT. RESOURCES L. [Vol.8 No.1
not subject to Order 1000 requirements.16 Nonetheless, the ERCOT used
competitive transmission system bids for new lines, with both utility and
independent companies winning.161 Two early examples of competition
have yielded mixed results. In both cases, competitive bids for transmission
contracts resulted in the incumbent utility being chosen over the
independent bidder, even when the incumbent's bid was not the lowest
price.62 In California, the incumbent utility was chosen not because it
offered the lowest cost, but because the California independent system
operator (ISO) determined that there were experiential, legal siting, and
permitting advantages with the incumbent's legal team.1 63 On the East
coast, in PJM, who was the largest U.S. ISO among various bidders, the
incumbent utility bid was chosen because it owned the existing rights-of-
way to be used in the development of the transmission line, even though its
bid was more than double the lowest bid.
164
D. Federal Court Preemption of Certain Unauthorized State Energy
Regulation
The federal courts have supported FERC regulation in most regards,
and preempted state regulation in these fields of energy, especially where it
reaches a contrary result. Set forth below is the legal structure for energy
preemption under the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution, the Federal Power Act, and key federal court determinations.
1. The Preemption of State Regulation
"' Elec. Light & Power/Powergrid Int'l, FERC Order 1000 Changes Competitive Landscape of
Transmission Owners, ELEC. LIGHT & POWER (Sept. 3,2014),
http://www.elp.com/articles/2014/09/ferc-order-1000-changes-competitive-landscape-of-
transmission-owners.html.
161 Id.
162 See id.
16' Id. ("The California Independent System Operator (CAISO) put a 59-mile, 230 kV Gates-
Gregg transmission line up for competitive bid in 2013... [Among bidders, the ISO selected the
incumbent joint venture between Pacific Gas & Electric Co. and MidAmerican Transmission] because
of its significant experience developing and operating transmission projects as well as knowledge of the
siting and permitting requirements in California. CAISO stated it would be more costly and time
consuming.., to obtain the rights-of-way....").
64 Id. (stating that in the 2012 Artificial Island request for proposal, there were twenty-six
proposals submitted by eight different transmission developers, including incumbent and non-
incumbent utilities as well as independent investment groups, and the selected winner was a joint
venture between Dominion Resources and incumbent Public Service Electric and Gas Company,
which at nearly $250 million far exceeded the low bid of S100 million. The incumbent held the existing
rights-of-way to be used in the development of the transmission line but after criticism of favoritism,
PJM temporarily suspended the process).
100
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According to a long-standing and consistent line of rulings by the U.S.
Supreme Court, when a transaction is subject to exclusive federal FERC
jurisdiction and regulation, state regulation is preempted by federal law,
falling under the purview of the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution.16 5 As stated by Justice Scalia, "[i]t is common ground that if
FERC has jurisdiction over a subject, the States cannot have jurisdiction
over the same subject."166
The Federal Power Act, §§ 205 and 206,167 empower the FERC to
exclusively regulate rates for the interstate and wholesale sale and
transmission of electricity.168 The U.S. Supreme Court held that Congress
meant to draw a "bright line," easily ascertained and not requiring case-by-
case analysis between state and federal jurisdiction.
169
The rates, terms, and provisions of any wholesale sale or transmission
of electricity in interstate commerce are exclusively within federal
jurisdiction and control, not state authority. Under the Federal Power Act,
FERC has "exclusive authority to regulate the transmission and sale at
wholesale of electric energy in interstate commerce, without regard to the
source of production."17 Generally speaking, "if Congress evidences an
intent to occupy a given field, any state law falling within that field is
preempted."'7'
2. FederalAuthority over Transmission Terms and Costs
"' New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982) (overturning an order of
the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission that restrained within the state, for the financial
advantage of in-state ratepayers, low-cost hydroelectric energy produced within the state, as an
impermissible violation of section 8, clause 3, and the Federal Power Act); Montana-Dakota Utils. Co.
v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251 (1951); Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476
U.S. 953 (1986); Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988); Entergy La.,
Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 539 U.S. 39 (2003).
'" Miss. Power &Light Co., 487 U.S. at 377 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
167 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d-824e (2015).
168 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2015).
"6 Fed. Power Comm'n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205,215-16 (1964).
175 New England Power Co., 455 U.S. at 340; see also Nantahala Power &Light Co., 476 U.S. at
956 (the Commission "has exclusive jurisdiction over interstate wholesale power rates."); see also
Utilimax.com v. PPL Energy Plus L.L.C., 378 F.3d 303,305 (3d Cit. 2004) (finding that the Third
Circuit has similarly argues that the "wholesale market for electrical energy is regulated by [the
Commission]" and "[o]ne of[the Commission's] duties is to set 'just and reasonable' wholesale electric
rates.").
171 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238,248 (1984); see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v.
State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,212 (1983).
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Transmission costs are allocated within an ISO region either by
electricity demand or by a percentage in each state (on a kWh basis).
1 72
New transmission to strengthen the grid, and for renewable power
deployment, could cost $100 billion.1 7 The Brattle Group estimates that it
may take as much as $1.5 trillion to update the grid by 2030."74 As the
Supreme Court has noted, it is now "possible for a customer in Vermont
[to] purchase electricity from an environmentally friendly power producer
in California or a cogeneration facility in Oklahoma."17 And since power is
only usable when delivered to users over a copper wire network, movement
and transmission of power in this way is the key connection.176
In Illinois Commerce Commission v. FERC, the FERC sought to impose
a tariff primarily intended to finance the installation of new lines that
would transmit "electricity generated by remote wind farms."177 The tariff
was challenged unsuccessfully as a subsidy for wind power producers, and
allowed to stand as ordered by FERC.'7 8 Justice Richard Posner, speaking
for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, affirmed the FERC's approval of
the Midwest Independent Service Operator's (MISO)179 proportionate
customer utility allocation of transmission costs for high-voltage
transmission lines to move renewable wind power to populated areas.180
With regard to the holding on the respective jurisdiction of state and
federal government to regulate electricity, the court relied upon a law
172 Bob Bibbo, Normandeau Assocs., Presentation at the Northeast Energy and Commerce
Association (NECA) Conference on Environmental Issues: Permitting Linear Grid Assets (July 24,
2014).
1' See Nuel Navarrete, U.S. Grid Needs $100 Billion for Renewable Energy Capability, ECOSEED
(Oct. 15, 2010 5:39 AM), http://ecoseed.org/business/14092-u-s-grid-needs-100-billion-for-
renewable-energy-capability.
174 U.S. DEP'T. OF ENERGY, SMART GRID SYSTEM REPORT, viii (July 2009) (citing MARC W.
CHUPKA, ET AL., TRANSFORMING AMERICA'S POWER INDUSTRY: THE INVESTMENT
CHALLENGE 2010-2030 (2008), available at
http://www.edisonfoundation.net/iei/Documentsfransforming-Americas Power_Industry.pd0.
1 New Yorkv. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 8 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
176 Self-generated distributed power does not require connection to the integrated network, but
this exception is not the subject of this article. See Steven Ferrey, Exit Strategy: State LegalDiscretion to
Environmentally Sculpt the Deregulating Electric Environment, 26 HARV.ENVTL. L. REV. 109 (2002),
for more on such distributed generated options.
' See Ill. Commerce Comm'n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 771 (7th Cir. 2013).
171 Id. at 781.
... MISO, CORPORATE INFORMATION 1-2 (2014), available at http://perma.cc/75L9-GV74
(MISO's service area extends from the Canadian border, then east to Michigan and parts of Indiana,
south to northern Missouri, and west to eastern areas of Montana).
" See Ill. Commerce Comm'n, 721 F.3d at 764 (stating that MISO allocated the costs of the
transmission projects among all of the utilities that draw power from the MISO grid in proportion to
each utility's overall volume of usage, and FERC approved MISO's rate design, which led some states
to initiate court appeal).
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review article on Constitutional energy issues authored by Professor Steven
Ferrey.1
8
3. FederalAgencies Determine their own Jurisdictional Reach
In terms of the federal-state dichotomy in the exercise of
administrative legal jurisdiction, federal agencies were recently given more
discretion to determine the scope of their own authority. In the 2013
Supreme Court decision Arlington v. FCC, the majority held that Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., applies to an agency's
interpretation of the scope of its own statutory jurisdiction: "statutory
ambiguities will be resolved, within the bounds of reasonable
interpretation, not by the courts but by the administering agency."182 There
is no difference between deference afforded to the agency by an agency's
"jurisdictional" or "non-jurisdictional" interpretations:"8 3 [if] "the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute, that is the end
of the matter."
184
In 2014, in a separate 6-2 opinion, the Supreme Court held that federal
agencies are entitled to deference to agency discretion in devising
regulations, as per Chevron."'5 This overruled a determination that federal
rules did not defer sufficiently to state implementation.'
8 6
"'Id. (citing Steven Ferrey, Threading the Constitutional Needle with Care: The Commerce Clause
Threat to the New Infrastructure ofRenewabk Power, 7 TEX. J. GAS & ENERGY L. 59, 69, 106-07
(2011-2012)).
... City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863,1868 (2013) (citing Chevron v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)) (noting that under Chevron, the Court must first ask whether
Congress directly spoke to the precise question at issue; if so, the Court must give effect to Congress'
unambiguously expressed intent, and if "the statute is silent or ambiguous," the court must defer to the
administering agency's construction of the statute so long as it is permissible); see also AT&T Corp. r.
Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999).
"'.There is no exception that exists to the normal deferential standard of review forjurisdictional
and legal questions. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys. Inc., 465 U.S. 822,830 n.7 (1984). "[Tlhere is no
principled basis for carving out an arbitrary subset of'jurisdictional' questions from the Chevron
framework." (quoting Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1865); see, e.g., Nat'l Cable &Telecomms. Ass'n v. Gulf
Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 333,339 (2002).
184 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (giving the "Chevron deference" to agencies' constructions of the
scope of their own jurisdiction); seeArlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1870-71; see also, e.g., United States v.
Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305,316 n.7 (2008).
".. See EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1609-10 (2014).
"' Id. While employing a different mechanism than CAIR to address cross-state pollution, the
court found that it required some states to reduce emissions by more than what they contributed to
downwind state pollution. Fifteen 15 states sought review of CSAPR, while six states intervened to
support the rule. Id. at 1595-96.
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4. Federal Jurisdiction over Use of Price to Site Location of Power
Projects
In separate federal courts, New Jersey'8 7 and Maryland8 ' both lost
constitutional challenges to regional generators of power in cases regarding
in-state wholesale power subsidies.18 9 In 2014, both the Third and Fourth
Circuit Courts of Appeals upheld each decision.190
A federal court in Maryland'91 determined that Maryland's "contract
for differences (CfD)," requiring local utilities to enter into long-term
power purchase agreements, was an impermissible intrusion of state
regulation on regional wholesale rates, and that it disrupted FERC-
approved wholesale power markets.192 The court concluded that when
Maryland manipulates the prices of wholesale power markets, the utilities
and, correspondingly Maryland ratepayers, are directly affected by the
resulting wholesale prices.'93 The court held the Maryland regulation
violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution by virtue
of field preemption, stating: 19 4' "The doctrine of field preemption forecloses
state regulation in a field occupied entirely by the federal government, even
if the state's purpose is admirable or the state regulation does not conflict
with achievement of the federal scheme."
95
The court continued, reasoning that no rationale permits a state to
cross the "bright line" limiting jurisdiction or to invade "a federally
occupied field."' 96 Under the Federal Power Act, as well as the Supremacy
187 See PPL EnergyPlus, L.L.C. v. Hanna, 977 F. Supp. 2d 372,406 (D.NJ. 2013) (deciding the
issue of whether the NewJersey program violated the Supremacy Clause), affdsub nom. PPL
EnergyPlus, L.L.C. v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241, 255 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding field preemption on
wholesale power prices and rates).
'.. See PPL EnergyPlus, L.L.C. v. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d 790, 796 (D. Md. 2013)
(memorandum of decision) ("Plaintiffs have established their claim that the... (Maryland program]
violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution by virtue of field preemption"), affd
petition for cert.filed, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014).
"' PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 135 F.E.R.C. 61,022, at 61,087 (2011) (order accepting
proposed tariff revisions).
'" Solomon, 766 F.3d at 246 (noting field preemption on wholesale prices and rates); Nazarian,
753 F.3d at 471.
... See Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 790.
192 Nazarian, 753 F.3d at 473 (stating that the court was persuaded in part by expert testimony
explaining that the CfD went beyond a mere financing arrangement because it reflected the same
factors typically used to establish rates and dictated the manner in which CPV (the winning bidder)
could participate in PJM markets); see also Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 834.
193 Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 815.
194 Id. at 796.
'I1d. at 840; see Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502-03 (2012).
.96 Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 830 ("Where a state action falls within a field Congress intended
the federal government alone to occupy, the good intentions and importance of the state's objective are
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Clause, states cannot dictate the ultimate market price for wholesale energy
and capacity sales.'97 The case raised field preemption and conflict
preemption of the NewJersey LCAPP CfD proposal.9 '
A similar federal court decision in New Jersey held that the state was
impermissibly regulating wholesale energy prices to promote the
construction of new generation facilities in New Jersey.'99 The court held
that conflict preemption "prevents state regulation of, or influence over,
the wholesale price for energy transactions."20 The state LCAPP
regulation was held to:
[I]ntrude upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Commission, by establishing the price that LCAPP
[affected New Jersey] generators will receive for their sales
of capacity. The Court finds that in doing so, the LCAPP
'places a direct burden upon interstate commerce' within
the meaning of the Attleboro decision. Accordingly, the
LCAPP Act invades the field occupied by Congress and is
preempted by the Federal Power Act.2 '
5. FederalJurisdiction over all Wholesale Power Sales
In 2012, a federal court ruled that Vermont's regulation of its
wholesale power preferences and sales violated the U.S. Constitution.°2
Preemption of state jurisdiction to regulate wholesale power transactions,
as well as dormant Commerce Clause violations resulting from state
attempts to discriminate in the preference for in-state regulation of power
moving in interstate commerce,20 3 resulted in the federal court's finding of
immaterial to the field preemption analysis. Field preemption requires the state to 'yield to the force of
federal law..., notwithstanding that [the state's action] is constructed upon values familiar to many
and cherished by most, and notwithstanding that it may fit neatly within or alongside the federal
scheme.'") (quoting French v. Pan Am Exp., Inc., 869 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1989)).
'.. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 840.
I9s d. at 825,841; PPL EnergyPlus, L.L.C. v. Hanna, 977 F. Supp. 2d 372 (D.NJ. 2013).
" Hanna, 977 F. Supp. 2d at 372.
200 Id. at 410-11 (citing Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988)) (quoting Free v. Bland, 369
U.S. 663, 666 (1962)); see also Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992)
("[E]ven state regulation designed to protect vital state interests must give way to paramount federal
legislation.") (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351,357 (1976)).
20 Hanna, 977 F. Supp. 2d at 409.
252 Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, L.L.C. v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 183, 242-43 (D. Vt. 2012),
affd in part, revtd in part, 733 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2013).
203 See infra Part V.A (dormant Commerce Clause issues).
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unconstitutionality.2 4 Under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 791a et
seq.):
Congress has drawn a bright line between state and federal
authority in the setting of wholesale rates and in the
regulation of agreements that affect wholesale rates. States
may not regulate in areas where FERC has properly
exercised its jurisdiction to determine just and reasonable
wholesale rates or to insure that agreements affecting
wholesale rates are reasonable." Miss. Power & Light Co.
v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 374 (1988) . .. [A]
state "must [...] give effect to Congress' desire to give
FERC plenary authority over interstate wholesale rates,
and to ensure that the States do not interfere with this
authority. Under the "filed-rate doctrine," state courts and
regulatory agencies are preempted by federal law from
requiring the payment of rates other than the federal filed
rate. See Entergy La., Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 539
U.S. 39, 47 (2003) ("The filed rate doctrine requires 'that
interstate power rates filed with FERC or fixed by FERC
must be given binding effect by state utility commissions
determining intrastate rates.").20
5
The Second Circuit upheld this decision, although an additional claim
was found not yet ripe for review.2 °6
An increasingly large majority of U.S. power now proceeds through a
wholesale power sale prior to its ultimate retail sale and disposition,
217
thereby fundamentally altering the legal analysis of what is, and is not,
jurisdictional for a state and the federal government to regulate.08
Restructuring and deregulation of the retail electric power sector,
2 0
EntergyNuclear Vt. Yankee, 838 F. Supp. 2d at 242-43.
2"5 Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986).
206 Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, 733 F.3d at 433.
207 THE ELEC. ENERGY MKr. TASK FORCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON COMPETITION IN
WHOLESALE AND RETAIL MARKETS FOR ELECTRIC ENERGY, Electric Energy Market
Competition Task Force 10 (2007), available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/fed-sta/ene-pol-act/epact-
final-rpt.pdf("In the 1970s, vertically integrated utility companies (investor-owned, municipal, or
cooperative [utilities]) controlled over 95 percent of the electric generation in the United States....
[Bly 2004 electric utilities owned less than 60 percent of electric generating capacity. Increasingly,
decisions affecting retail customers and electricity rates are split among federal, state, and new private,
regional entities.").
201 See INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 5, §§ 5:26-5:28; ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note
4, at 560-61.
106
2015-2016] COMPETITIVE ORDERS, THE FINAL MONOPOLY 107
commencing at the state level around 1997, dramatically changed the
regulatory paradigm. °9 About 30% of states restructured prior to the
electric sector problems in California from 2000 to 2001, with the other
70% of the states retaining traditionally structured retail electric sectors, as
shown in Figure 5.21
Figure 5
Deregulation at Retail Level in States
41
A sizeable amount of power generation facilities, particularly wind and
solar, are now owned by independent wholesale market participants, rather
than the retail utility companies that deliver power to retail customers.
211
The amount of power wholesaled before it is sold at retail has shifted from
only 8% in the 1960s to a majority today.212 As noted by various federal
2 9 ENVRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 3, at 149-50.
210 See Steven Ferrey, Sale of Electricity, in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY: EFFICIENCY AND
RENEWABLES 217,218-19 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2011) [hereinafter Sale of Electricity].
211 See Steven Ferrey, Pentagon Preemption: The 5-Sided Loss of State Energy and Power, 2014 U.
ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 393, 408 n.107 (2014) [hereinafter Pentagon Preemption] ("This spun
generation assets, including nuclear generation, out into independent ownership not subject to state
regulation. The costs of these independent wholesale power entities are not recovered through state-
regulated retail rates, but rather through wholesale rates subject to FERC's exclusive jurisdiction.".
(citation omitted)).
212 See INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 5, at 10-11; ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 3, at
587.
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courts, and affirmed by the Supreme Court, these independent market
participants are the new competitive reality in power and energy markets:
213
When combined with federal preemption law, one crucial result of
these energy market regulatory reforms has been 'a massive shift in
regulatory jurisdiction from the states to FERC.'... The upshot of these
federal and state innovations in electricity regulation is that state
regulators, despite their continued authority over rates charged directly to
consumers, have much less actual authority over those rates than they did
[earlier]. Local utilities now obtain power largely through wholesale
contracts subject to FERC's exclusive regulation, rather than through self-
generated and transmitted power... Although state regulators formerly
took an extremely active role so as to ensure the just and reasonable retail
power rates, FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over the wholesale rates that
now drive the electric power market and, as a practical matter, largely
determine the rates ultimately charged to the public.214 The entrance of
new wholesale competitive power market participants shifts regulatory
jurisdiction over energy commerce and transactions from states to the
FERC. In this newly deregulated environment, the cost of building and
operating facilities is no longer recovered directly through retail rates.
215
Instead, retail customers pay for the retail distribution utility's cost of
buying wholesale power in a wholesale transaction, subject to the FERC's
exclusive jurisdiction over wholesale power transactions.216 As a result,
many of the traditional state responsibilities for regulating power have now
shifted to the FERC through its exclusive regulatory authority over the
rates, terms, and conditions of wholesale sales and transmission of
power,217 as well as to the competitive power market in approximately one-
third of the states.21 s
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that states are
preempted by the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution
219
from directly or indirectly interfering with federal power regulation.220
When applied to electric power issues, the Supremacy Clause of the
213 See INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 5, at 269-70.
214 See Pub. Util. Dist. No. I v. FERC, 471 F.3d 1053, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2006), affdinpart,
rev'd in part sub nom. Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1,554 U.S. 527 (2008); see
also Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, L.L.C. v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2013).
211 See Sale of Electricity, supra note 210, at 219-20.
216 Id.
217 See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2006); see also ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 3, at 569.
21' See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 3, at 594.
219 U.S. CONST. art. VI, d. 2.
220 FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 760-61 (1982).
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Constitution221 is embodied in the Filed Rate Doctrine, which establishes
an absolute line the states may not cross to regulate electric power.222 The
Court has held that the Federal Power Act invests the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission with "exclusive authority to regulate the
transmission and sale at wholesale of electric energy in interstate
commerce. 223
The Supreme Court in 1986,224 and again in 1988,225 2003,26 and
2008,227 reaffirmed and enforced the Filed Rate Doctrine as applied
through the Supremacy Clause, when states attempted to assert
jurisdiction in areas subject to the FERC's exclusive authority. The 1986
Supreme Court decision concluded that the Filed Rate Doctrine
limitations also apply ". . . to decisions of state courts."22 The Filed Rate
Doctrine is an absolute prohibition of state regulation of wholesale power
rates, contracts and terms, which are reserved exclusively to federal
authority: "The filed rate doctrine is not limited to 'rates' per se: 'our
inquiry is not at an end because the orders do not deal in terms of prices or
volumes of purchases."29 The Supreme Court in 2008 reiterated that the
Federal Power Act creates a "'bright line' between state and federal
jurisdiction with wholesale power sales.. falling on the federal side of the
line." 30 This most recent decision articulated an unbroken line of
Supremacy Clause application barring state regulation:
Congress has drawn a bright line between state and federal
authority in the setting of wholesale rates and in the
regulation of agreements that affect wholesale rates. States
may not regulate in areas where FERC has properly
exercised its jurisdiction to determine just and reasonable
221 U.S. CONST. art. IV, ci. 2.
222 Entergy La., Inc. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 539 U.S. 39, 49-50 (2003); Miss. Power &
Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 371 (1988); Nantahala Power & Light Co. v.
Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 964 (1986).
223 See Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, L.L.C. v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 183, 233 (D. Vt. 2012)
(noting that the state withheld a Certificate of Public Good until Vermont Yankee entered a below-
market power purchase agreement with state entities crossed this "bright line" separating federal and
state authority pursuant to the Supremacy Clause); see also 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2006).224 
Nantabala Power &Light Co., 476 U.S. at 963.
" Miss. Power &Light Co., 487 U.S. at 355.
226 Entergy La., 539 U.S. at 40.
227 Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1,554 U.S. 527 (2008).
221 Nantabala Power & Light Co., 476 U.S. at 963.
229 Id. at 966-67 (quoting N. Nat. Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84, 90-91 (1963)).
"o See Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. FERC, 471 F.3d 1053, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Nantahala
Power & Light Co., 476 U.S. at 966; Fed. Power Comm'n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215
(1964); Miss. Power & Light Co., 487 U.S. at 371).
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wholesale rates or to insure that agreement affecting
wholesale rates are reasonable.
2 31
E. Where FederalAuthority Cannot Intrude on Power
The FERC is not without restrictions in supporting competition.
With regard to two significant matters, the federal courts have prevented
FERC orders or actions to increase the competitive scope of electric supply
in the United States.232 The first decision bars federal action to increase the
amount of transmission corridors for carrying power across state lines from
its point of production to regions of consumption.233 The second decision
bars FERC from issuing orders that require regional power grid managers
to allow demand resources (i.e. cutbacks in power), to compete on an equal
basis with power generation.234 Both change the landscape of the new
power environment and will be further discussed in this article.
1. No Federal Preemption of Transmission Line Siting
Engineers recognized the high-voltage transmission network, or the
"grid," as the most important engineering feat of the twentieth century.235
In terms of physical assets, the grid is composed of approximately 2,000
electric distribution utilities, 7,000 power plants, over 300,000 miles of
transmission and distribution lines to connect with consumers, and the
hardware to manage all of this in an energized instantaneous network.2 36 At
230 kV and higher, the "grid" comprises 167,000 miles of line in
America.23 7 In the U.S. there is an eastern interconnection, a western
interconnection, and a separate interconnection that includes most of
Texas.23SThe transmission system operates at fifteen different voltage
231 Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 374 (1988).
232 See Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304,315 (4th Cir. 2009); Elec. Power
Supply Ass'n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216,219 (2014).
13 Piedmont Envtl. Council, 558 F.3d 304 at 315.
' Elec. Power SupplyAss'n, 753 F.3d at 221.
15 Pentagon Preemption, supra note 211, at 419 (citing Mason Wilirich, Electricity Transmission
PolicyforAmerica: Enabling a Smart Grid, End to End, 22 ELEC. J. 77, 77 (2009)).
236 What is the Electric Power Grid and What are Some Challenges it Faces?, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/energy-in-brief/artide/power-grid.cfm (last updated Sept. 16, 2014); see
also Glossary: Electric Power Grid, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/glossary/glossary-e.htm#electr-pow-grid (last visited Oct. 20, 2015).
237 STAN MARK KAPLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40511, ELECTRIC POWER
TRANSMISSION: BACKGROUND AND POLICY ISSUES 2, n.3 (2009), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/122949.pdf (discussing miles of transmission lines).
23 Id. at 3 fig.2 (providing a visual display of interconnections).
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levels,2" 9 with limited power transactions between these three major
interconnections. In 2010, the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation ("NERC") concluded that an additional 39,000 circuit miles
of new transmission capacity would need to be constructed during the
following ten years to maintain long-term reliability of the "grid" and to
integrate intermittent additional renewable power generation.
240
In 2005, Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act ("EPAct 2005"),
which added § 216 to the Federal Power Act, 241 and which directed the
Department of Energy ("DOE") to study transmission congestion in
consultation with the states.242 Section 216 allows DOE to designate
certain transmission-constrained areas as National Interest Electric
Transmission Corridors ("NIETCs"), 243  and grants the FERC the
authority under certain circumstances to issue permits to construct
transmission facilities in these NIETCs. 44 After the addition of § 216, the
DOE designated two critical corridors as NIETCs: the Mid-Atlantic Area
National Corridor in the Midwest and Atlantic regions, and the Southwest
Area National Corridor in Arizona and California.
245
Shortly after the enactment of EPAct 2005, the FERC issued Order
No. 689 in 2006, which detailed the various requirements and procedures
for applications submitted under § 216.46 The federal push for NIETCs
under the EPAct 2005 was criticized for turning environmentally sensitive
areas into energy corridors, and for essentially running a giant extension
cord to existing coal sources.247 Environmental groups filed multiple suits
on this and past FERC actions for failure to adequately assess greenhouse
239 Pentagon Preemption, supra note 211, at 410 (citing Craig Cano, Efficiency Should Be Viewed
As Key Part of Entire Delivery System, WellinghoffSays, ELEC. UTIL. WEEK, Dec. 13,2010, at 18, 19).24oN. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., 2010 LONG-TERM RELIABILITYASSESSMENT 23
(Oct. 2010), available at http://www.nerc.com/fdes/2010_ltra-v2-.pdf.
241 16 U.S.C. § 82 4p (2011).
242 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1221(a), 119 Stat. 594,946 (2005) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 15801 et. seq. (2010)).
243d.
244 See 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b) (2011).
241 See Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2011)
(holding that DOE's actual designations of these corridors were arbitrary, capricious, and not
supported by evidence).
246 See Regulations for Filing Applications for Permits to Site Interstate Electric Transmission
Facilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 69,440 (Dec. 1, 2006) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 50,380).
247 Steven Ferrey, Follow the Money!Article I andArticle IV Constitutional Barriers to Renewable
Energy in the U.S. Future, 17 Va.J.L. & Tech. 89, 141 (2012) [hereinafter Follow the Money.].
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gas ("GHG") impacts under the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA").248
In 2009, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the FERC has no authority to
issue permits under § 216 when a state denies an application for siting
transmission facilities.249 Rather, the Fourth Circuit found that the
FERC's backstop authority is limited to instances in which a state
withholds approval for more than a year.2 0 The state's decision to take
action, such as the denial of a permit, did not invoke the FERC's ability to
intercede.
25 1
A decision in 2011 vacated the DOE's 2007 Transmission Congestion
Study, which designated NIETCs in Mid-Atlantic and Southwestern
states.2 2 This was one of the decisions that limited or undermined the §
216 federal siting authority.25 The Ninth Circuit ruled that the DOE did
not properly consult with affected states in preparing the Congestion
Study, as required by § 216, and also failed to consider the environmental
effects of designating NIETCs under NEPA.254 This is therefore one area
in which federal authority does not preempt state authority. States retain
complete authority over the physical sites of electric transmission lines.255
Once in place, the FERC and federal authority controls all tariffs and
terms for transmission of power and the sale of wholesale power.25 6
2. FERC Order 745: No Authority over Demand Response in Lieu of
Power Supply
Another FERC action, Order 745, mandated that ISOs pay demand-
response resources on an equal basis with power generation resources for
energy-the Locational Marginal Price ("LMP") calculated for each hour
of the next operating day25 7 -as an alternative to a generation resource
241 See Ctr. for Biological Diversityv. Natl Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172 (9th
Cir. 2008); Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520 (8th Cir. 2003); Border
Power Plant Working Grp. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 260 F. Supp. 2d 997 (S.D. Cal. 2003).
249 Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304,315 (4th Cir. 2009).
25
0 Id.
252 Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1107 (9th Cir. 2011).
213 Id. at 1106 (discussing DOE's authority to designate NIETC's and FERC's authority to issue
construction permits under § 216).
24 Id. at 1107.
25 See Order No. 1000, supra note 139, 287.
216 See Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. FERC, 471 F.3d 1053, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2006), affdinpart,
rev'd in part sub noma. Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1,554 U.S. 527 (2008); see
also Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, L.L.C. v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393 (2d Ci. 2013).
257 Elec. Power Supply Ass'n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216,219 (2014) (stating that LMP is the market
price used to compensate nergy generators in organized wholesale energy markets, and is calculated to
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when the dispatch of the demand-response resource is cost-effective.58
This would diversify energy resources and support wider competition
among technologies. While not many consumers have their own
generation units, it would seem that all should be capable of supplying
energy
reduction in response to incentives.
When challenged in court, the FERC unsuccessfully asserted its
authority under the Chevron doctrine with regard to the broad 'affecting'
language of §§ 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act,2" 9 and the policy
statements in the EPAct 2005.260 Section 205 directs the FERC to ensure
that "all rules and regulations affecting . . . rates" in connection with
wholesale sales of electric energy are "just and reasonable."261 Although the
court agreed that demand response affects the wholesale market, the court
found this to go beyond the limits of §§ 205 and 206.262 The court ruled
that Order No. 745 constituted FERC regulation of retail sales of
electricity, which is exclusively within the legal authority of states .263 The
FERC argued that it was only regulating "practices" affecting wholesale
energy markets.264 However, the court concluded this would leave no
boundaries on the FERC's authority.265 As the court stated, §§ 205 and
206 "could ostensibly authorize FERC to regulate any number of areas,
including the steel, fuel, and labor markets . . . If FERC thinks its
jurisdictional struggles are its only concern with Order 745, it is
mistaken.
266
In this split decision, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
overturned FERC Order No. 745, vacating it in its entirety, and later
denying a petition for rehearing en banc.26' FERC's opponents argued that
Order 745 "over-compensates" demand response resources because it
reflect the least-cost of providing incremental mega-watt hours of demand at each location on the
transmission grid; therefore, prices alter based on location and time).
... Id. (stating that the cost effectiveness is determined by a "net benefits test," which ensures that
the benefit of the reduced LMP that results from dispatching demand-response resources exceeds the
cost of dispatching and paying LMP to those resources).
259 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d-824e (2011).
265 See Elec. Power Supply Ass'n, 753 F.3d at 236.
61 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2011) (emphasis added).
262 Elec. Power Supply Ass'n, 753 F.3d 216, at 221 (stating that the states have exclusive authority
to regulate the retail market of electric energy, thus the "affecting" authority does not allow FERC to
overreach into the retail market regulation under Federal Power Act §201 limits. A broad "affecting"
authority would allow FERC to directly regulate the retail market whenever the retail market affects the
wholesale market, rendering the states' exclusive retail market jurisdiction a nullity).
263 Id. at 224.
26
4 Id.
265 Id. at 222.
266 Id. 221-22,225.
267 Id. at 225.
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requires LMP compensation plus "allows savings retention associated with
avoided retail generation cost."26 s The court agreed and noted that
"[c]omparable contributions cannot be [a valid] reason for equal
compensation, when generation resources are incomparably saddled with
generation costs . . "..269 The FERC cannot justify current over-
compensation by alleged past under-compensation, and demand response
resources receive an unjustified potential windfall.27 °
In addition to exercising intruding jurisdiction, the court found that
the FERC failed to address arguments that the authorized demand
response payments were excessive at the same price paid to wholesale
energy suppliers.2 1 This subsidized demand response, which would receive
payments for not using electricity and benefit from a lower energy bill,
"seem[ed] troubling."272 The D.C. Circuit articulated a key distinction with
demand response: "demand response resources do not actually sell into the
market. Demand response does not involve a sale, and the resources
'participate' only by declining to act."273 Under the Federal Power Act, the
FERC is empowered to regulate "the sale of electric energy at wholesale in
interstate commerce."274  The court reasoned that a reduction in
consumption of electric energy for monetary payments to decrease electric
energy consumption is not actually a sale into the market.
27 5
In his dissent, Judge Edwards concluded that the FERC had
jurisdiction to issue Order 745 because demand response is an ambiguous
matter of retail regulation under the Federal Power Act, and demand
response resources subject to the rule's limitations directly affect wholesale
electricity prices.2 Judge Edwards noted, "this court has no business
second-guessing the Commission's judgment on the level of
compensation."277 The majority ruled that Order No. 745 was FERC
regulation of retail sales of electricity, exclusively within the legal authority
of states.2 7' Thus, it is clear that the FERC's authority to promote
competition has legal limits when it crosses the line beyond sales of power.
.. Id. (citing Demand Response Compensation i  Organized Wholesale Energy Markets: Order on
Rehearing and Clarification, 137 F.E.R.C. 61,215 (2011)).
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 See id.
272 See id.
273 Id. at 221.
274 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2011) (emphasis added).
275 Eke. Power Supply Ass'n, 753 F.3d at 221.
176 Id. at 229.
277 Id. at 238 (citing La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FERC, 551 F.3d 1042, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 2008)).
278 Id. at 221.
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IV. STATE INCENTIVES TO PROMOTE COMPETITION IN IN-STATE
POWER
Approximately sixteen states independently decided to increase
competition and partially or fully deregulate retail power transactions in
their states.279 States have adopted a significant set of incentives to promote
competitive generation of power by independent power producers,
concentrating on renewable energy with five legal and policy initiatives:
" Net Metering: 85% of states
* Renewable portfolio standards: 65% of states
* Renewable System Benefit Charges: 33% of states
" Carbon and GHG regulation: 20% of the states
* Feed-In Tariffs: 10% of states28
Under each policy, the state acts as a regulator, and neither owns the
renewable power generation capital equipment, nor transacts any sale of
the power produced itself.28' It is this action as a regulator, rather than a
market participant, which can raise constitutional issues with regard to
discriminatory state renewable energy initiatives.2" 2 Below is a brief
overview of these state pro-competition initiatives for independent non-
utility entities. Then, the section that follows outlines treatment of the
anti-competitive discriminatory aspects of some of these state programs.
A. Feed-In Tariffs
A feed-in tariff ("FIT") is a regulatory requirement that some impose
on their regulated utilities to purchase certain designated types of
independent power generation on a wholesale basis, typically from
renewable resources or combined heat and power ("CHP") units, and at
prices well in excess of the market value of wholesale power.8 3 The
regulated utilities are forced to "buy high" in terms of other electric power
279 See supra Figure 5.
280 Steven Ferrey, Alternative Energy in a Spaghetti Western: Clint Eastwood Confronts State
Renewable Energy Policy, 32 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 279,288 (2012) [hereinafter Alternative Energy].
281 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 3, at 159-62 (examining the market participant
exception).
282 Id.
283 See INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 5, § 10:134.
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available in the market.2 84 FIT's administratively torque the operating
power market in favor of those who sell certain state-designated,
independent, competitive power, and do not adhere to accepted rate-
making methodology to minimize prudent utility-incurred costs.28 FIT
costs are passed on to captive consumers by the utilities." 6
The number of FITs has expanded dramatically during the past several
years from just a few policies in the 2000s, concentrated primarily in
Europe, to dozens of FIT policies in jurisdictions around the world.287 In
the mid-1990s, the federal courts and the FERC separately struck down
FITs in California.28 s Fifteen years later, after enacting a new FIT that
required California state utilities to make wholesale power purchases at
rates well in excess of wholesale rates and avoided costs, there was again a
challenge over whether this violated the Federal Power Act and the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.289
California was unsuccessful in arguing that it was only regulating the
buyers of power and not the sellers in the transaction. 290 The decision held
that the FERC's authority under the Federal Power Act includes the
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the rates, terms, and conditions of sales for
resale of electric energy in interstate commerce.29 1 The FERC held that
"even if a QF has been exempted pursuant to the Commission's regulations
from the ratemaking provisions of the Federal Power Act, a state still
cannot impose a ratemaking regime inconsistent with the requirements of
PURPA and this Commission's regulations-i.e., a state cannot impose
rates in excess of avoided cost."292 The FERC reiterated that only the
federal government can regulate commerce between the states, and
therefore California could not attempt to regulate commerce outside its
borders.293
2
'4 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWERANNUAL REPORT (Mar. 2015),
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/pdf/epa.pdf (providing the annual statistics for each state's
average cost to the ultimate consumer for electric power).
211 See INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 5, § 5:9.
216 See id. § 10:134.
287 See REN21, RENEWABLES 2013 GLOBAL STATUS REPORT 116 (2013), available at
http://www.ren2l.net/Portals/O/documents/Resources/GSR/2013/GSR2013_lowres.pdf.
" See Indep. Energy Producers Ass'n v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 36 F.3d 848,853 (9th Cir.
1994); see also S. Cal. Edison Co., 70 FERC 61,215, at 61,666 (1995).
289 See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 132 F.E.R.C. 61,047, at 61,327 (2010).
290 See id. 61,337-38.
291 See 16 U.S.C.A. § 824(a) (2011); e.g., Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487
U.S. 354, 376-77 (1988).
292 See Conn. Light & Power Co., 71 F.E.R.C. 61,035, at 61,153 (1995).
2"3 See generally Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 133 F.E.R.C. 61,059 (2010).
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B. Net Metering Credits
Under net metering, when the customer purchases and uses electricity
from the distribution company, the meter runs forward; when more
electricity is produced from the facility than is consumed by the customer,
the excess is sent to the electricity grid, running the meter in the opposite
direction and reversing the net accounting of power flow. 294 By turning the
meter backwards, and because only a single rate applies to a single meter,
net metering effectively compensates the generator at the full retail rate
(which includes that approximately two-thirds of the retail bill is
attributable to transmission, distribution, and taxes) for transferring just
the wholesale energy commodity-the power itself.95
Net metering supports competitive, on-site distributed power
generation.296 It is not designed to charge customers a fair price based on
ratemaking law, rather, it is a random price generally equal to the retail
price, which has no direct correspondence to the value of wholesale power
traded in the market.2 97 The net metering customer uses the distribution
grid twice (going and coming) and is assessed as if it does not use the grid at
all.
Forty-four states, as well as the District of Columbia, have authorized
net metering policies, while four states (Alabama, Mississippi, South
Dakota, and Tennessee) do not have net metering.298 As of 2003, there were
approximately 7,000 net metering customers in the U.S., with that number
increasing to 150,000 by 2010.299 Each of the forty-four state net metering
programs is distinct, differing as to allowable sizes of units, vintage and
294 See Glossary: Net Metering, DSIRE, http://www.dsireusa.org/support/glossary/ (last visited
Oct. 21, 2015) ("Vhen a customer's generation exceeds the customer's use, electricity from the
customer flows back to the grid, offsetting electricity consumed by the customer at a different time
during the same billing cycle.").
295 See id. ("In effect, the customer uses excess generation to offset electricity that the customer
otherwise would have to purchase at the utility's full retail rate."); see also NEW RULES, supra note 6, at
211-31 (providing more discussion as to whether electricity is a "good" or a "service," and how it should
be treated under the law).
... Net Metering: Policy Overview and State Legislative Updates, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGS. (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/net-metering-policy-overview-and-state-
legislative-updates.aspx.
'9' The wholesale price is a competitive price determined by the cost of generation. The retail rate
billed through the retail meter includes the wholesale cost of power, the cost of distribution, the cost of
transmission, a significant invisible tax imposed by state and local government not itemized on the bill,
system transition costs, and other system benefit charges or other subsidies incorporated in the retail
rates. The value of wholesale power transactions is not in any way equivalent to the charges in the retail
rate.
298 Net Metering: Policy Overview and State Legislative Updates, supra note 296.
299 
Participation in Electric Net-Metering Programs Increased Sharply in Recent Years, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 15, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=6270.
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longevity of credits, ability to cash out credits, eligible classes of customers,
and eligible technologies.300 States implementing net metering programs
vary widely in terms of maximum size limits. Those limits range from 1
MW in Indiana, to 80 MW in New Mexico.30 1 There is no limit in Arizona
and Ohio.302 In California, the maximum generation capacity is 1 MW,
and unused credits generated by a consumer, or group of consumers,
electing to net meter are reverted back to the utility at the end of each
year.30 3 In New York, there is a 2 MW cap on generation eligible for net
metering, but this limit only applies to non-residential solar or wind
projects, whose generators must stay below a 25 kW maximum.304 Some
states, such as Connecticut,3 °5 have "virtual net metering," which is more
far-reaching than other states because net-metering credits can be
transferred to other customers in the utility service territory.30 s
Electricity, unlike all other forms of energy, cannot be stored efficiently
for more than a second without being lost as waste heat.3 7 Therefore, a
nation's supply of electricity must match the demand for electricity over its
centralized utility grid on an instantaneous basis, or else the electric system
shuts down or expensive equipment is damaged.3 8 The utility must sell the
net-metered power immediately-within a nanosecond-or it will be lost
as waste heat.30 9 Additionally, the cost of producing electricity varies greatly
hour by hour, which makes the cost to the utility to produce or obtain the
power incredibly time-sensitive.310
C. State Renewable Portfolio Standards
A renewable portfolio standard ("RPS") induces certain electricity
sellers and buyers to maintain evidence of a predetermined percentage of
*o See Database of State Incentivesfor Renewables and Efficiency, DSIRE,
http://www.dsireusa.org (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) (allowing users to click on each state's net metering
policy to view the specific rules and regulations of that policy).
301 See Best Practices in State Net Metering Policies and Interconnection Procedures, FREEING THE
GRID, bttp//freeingtbegrid.org (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) (allowing users to click on map for
information on each state).
30
2 Id.
303Id.
304 Id.
305 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-244u (2011).
3
' Net Metering: Policy Overview and State Legislative Updates, supra note 296.
301 See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 3, at 542.
308 See STEVEN FERREY, UNLOCKING THE GLOBAL WARMING TOOLBOX: KEY CHOICES
FOR CARBON RESTRICTION AND SEQUESTRATION 149-150 (Stephen Hill ed., 2010) [hereinafter
UNLOCKING].
309 See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 3, at 542.
310 See Welcome, Smart Meters. Will Smart Devices and Prices Follow?, 23 ELEC.J. 3 (Aug. 2010).
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designated clean resources in their wholesale electric supply mixes. 1'
Independent, competitive power generators can make direct bilateral sales
of the renewable energy credits ("RECs") they have earned to retail power
suppliers, who are required by state law to purchase enough RECs each
year to equal the state's required percentage of power generation.312 Sixteen
states and the District of Columbia have RPSs.
313
It is estimated that 45% of the 4,300 MW of wind power
installed in the U.S. between 2001-2004 was motivated by
state RPSs, while an additional 15% of these installations
were motivated by state renewable energy trust funds and
subsidies.314 Current RPSs are projected to add 76,750
MW of additional renewable generation by 2025.3"s The
required percentage of energy delivered to consumers
from eligible renewable sources currently varies from less
than five percent to nearly thirty percent of annual retail
sales in various state programs.316 Furthermore, state RPS
programs differ greatly in terms of what technologies
qualify. 17 Many RPS programs target only new renewable
projects in lieu of existing projects.318
311 The resources such as renewables, DSM, or high efficiency fossil combustion, as defined by a
particular state, would be included in the company's overall resource portfolio. Portfolio requirements
can be applied to electricity sellers, such as generation companies and vertically integrated utilities as a
condition of continued market access. The requirements could also be applied to wholesale electricity
buyers, such as distribution companies and electricity brokers, but the states do not exercise authority
over wholesale markets.
"
2 
See Renewable Energy Certificates, U.S. DEP'T. OF ENERGY,
http://apps3.eere.energy.gov/greenpower/markets/certificates.shtml?page=5 (last visited Nov. 27,
2015).
313 Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB.,
http://www.nrel.gov/tech-deployment/state-ocal-governments/basics-portfolio-standards.html (last
visited Dec. 30, 2015).
314 MARK BOLLINGER & RYAN WISER, BALANCING COSTAND RISK: THE TREATMENT OF
RENEWABLE ENERGY IN WESTERN UTILITY RESOURCE PLANS 1 (2005), available at
https://emp.lbl.gov/sitesall/files/REPORT%2Obnl%20-%2058450_O.pdf.
"' Brad Plummer, The Biggest Figbt Over Renewable Energy Is Now in the States, WASH. POST
WONKBLOG (Mar. 25,2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2013/03/25/the-
biggest-fights-over-renewable-energy-are-now-happening-in-the-states/.
316 See, e.g., Indiana: Clean Energy Portfolio Goal, DSIRE,
http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/programL/detail/4832 (last updated May 12, 2015) (showing
Indiana's requirement that between 2013-2018, 4% of energy supplied to consumers must come from
eligible renewable sources); New Yorh" Renewable Portfolio Standard, DSIRE,
http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/93 (last updated Aug. 7, 2015) (showing New
York's requirement hat by the end of 2015, 29% of energy delivered to consumers must come from
eligible renewable sources).
3' Steven Ferrey et al., Fire and Ice: WorldRenewable Energy and Carbon Control Mechanisms
Confront Constitutional Barriers, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 125, 146-47 (2010) [hereinafter Fire
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Twenty-three of the twenty-nine states that have mandatory programs
trade and use RECs.319 As a quick calculation, the typical national cost a
utility incurs to purchase RECs is approximately a forty percent increase in
cost of the value of the wholesale power itself (not the total cost of retail
bundled cost including taxes).32 ° For a utility in Massachusetts, the REC
purchase price is currently about 120% the wholesale cost of the power
itself.2 1 With solar RECs, the price in some states has been averaging
500% over the value of the power, that is the cost to utilities for solar
RECs.3 22
State RPS geographic eligibility rules regarding RECs may limit
eligible projects geographically. A number of states have enacted RPS laws
that treat renewable energy created in the state, or within an immediate
geographic region, preferentially to renewable energy generated in other
states.3 23 This raises significant constitutional issues.324 A number of states
prohibit the REC credit for out-of-state or out-of-region generation
facilities.32 5 Some states attempt to limit projects to those constructed
within the state or require direct interconnection to the state or state-
connected regional grid.326 These geographic program restrictions raise
dormant commerce clause concerns under the U.S. Constitution.32 7
and Ice] (explaining that the percentage of renewable projects is different in each state as to the
following: energy versus capacity obligations; single-tier or multi-tier credit determinations; the
duration of purchase obligations; whether there are requirements for resource diversity;, whether there
are incentives for resource or technology diversity;, whether all default service providers must
participate; geographic eligibility for credits; whether there is differentiation by type of renewable
resource; whether credits can be earned only by new renewable generation units or also by pre-existing
units; the definition of new or incremental generation and where that is applicable; how multi-fuel
facilities are categorized; how off-grid resources are categorized; and whether distributed generation on
customer sides of meters is allowed).
31. See Steven Ferrey, Threading the Constitutional Needle 'with Care: The Commerce Clause Threat
to the New Infrastructure ofRenewable Power, 7 TEX.J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 59, 64-66 (2011-12).
319 See Programs: Renewables Portfolio Standard,
htp://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program?type=38& (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) (providing a table
where users can read summaries of RPS programs in states that have them).
32 Author's calculation (assuming a trading price of $15-20 for a state REC).
321 Author's calculation (assuming a $60/REC selling price with the wholesale power being
transacted in ISO-NE at an approximate average price of S50/MWh).
322 Author's calculations (assuming Massachusetts' solar RECs selling in the $220-500/SREC
trading range).
323 See infra text accompanying notes 365-68, 373-84.
324 See discussion infra Section V.B.
325 K.S. Cory & BJ. Swezey, Renewable Portfolio Standards in the States: Balancing Goals and
Implementation Strategies 8 (Natl Renewable Energy Lab., Technical Report No. NREL/TP-670-
41409, 2007), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy08osti/41409.pdf.
36 See infra notes 365-68, 384.
327 See infra note 389.
COMPETITIVE ORDERS, THE FINAL MONOPOLY 121
D. State System Benefit Charges
A system benefits charge ("SBC") is a per kilowatt power surcharge
imposed through monthly utility bills on all retail electricity consumers
within a state utility's service territory, which in turn funds an additional
state-controlled or state-administered energy fund.32  These state
renewable trust funds distribute money to subsidize various renewable
energy resource projects and technologies pursuant to state legislation.3 29
Approximately one-third of the U.S., seventeen states plus the District of
Columbia, have enacted SBC and "public benefit funds.""'
Most of these state programs only provide assistance to new
independent competitive energy projects. A number of these states, either
explicitly or as a matter of practice, will only fund sustainable energy
projects within their own states, even though power from all sources inside
and outside the state are taxed to create the SBC fund.33' For example, the
Illinois legislature decided its program would develop new renewable
energy resources and clean coal technologies for distributing its funds, but
"[t]he criteria should promote the goal of fostering investment in and the
development and use, in Illinois, of renewable energy resources."2
However, the effectuation of the desire to retain subsidy funds for in-state
benefit raises the constitutional issue of discriminating against commerce
in out-of-state electricity.
333
FITs are unconstitutional when adopted by states for their regulated
investor-owned utilities,334 and as examined below, RPS3 35 and net
metering336 have attracted protracted Constitutional scrutiny.
V. LEGAL CHALLENGE TO STATE ANTI-COMPETITIVE ENERGY
RESTRICTIONS
... Glossary: Public Benefit Funds, DSIRE, http://www.dsireusa.org/support/glossary/ (last
visited Oct. 15,2015); see also Kirsten H. Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause Threatto Market-Based
EnvironmentalRegulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243,295(1999).
329 Glossary: Public Benefit Funds, supra note 328; Engel, supra note 328, at 295-96.
330 See Elizabeth Doris et al., State of the States 2009: Renewable Energy Development and the Role
of Policy 65 (Nat' Renewable Energy Lab., Technical Report No. NREL-TP-6A2-46667, 2009),
available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fylOosti/46667.pdf.
33 See Engel, supra note 328, at 295.
332 0 ILL. COMP. STAT. 687/6-3(a)-(b) (2009) (emphasis added); see also 20 ILL. COMP. STAT.
687/6-4(b) (2008).
333 See Follow the Money!, supra note 247, at 102; Fire and Ice, supra note 317, at 158.
3' See discussion supra Section III.D.5.
331 See discussion infra Section V.B.
33 See discussion infra Section V.G.
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A. The Dormant Commerce Clause and State Policy
The Dormant Commerce Clause of United States Constitution
prohibits actions that are facially discriminatory against interstate
commerce, and thus discriminate against out-of-state competition.13 7 A
regulation that "evinces" discriminatory purpose against interstate
commerce "or unambiguously discriminates in its effect... almost always is
'invalid per se. " 3 s All objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause
protection, which includes electric energy in interstate commerce:339 "[lit is
difficult to conceive of a more basic element of interstate commerce than
electric energy, a product used in virtually every home and every
commercial or manufacturing facility. No State relies solely on its own
resources in this respect. "34
°
State RPS programs, FITs, system benefit charges, climate control
regulation, and net metering programs constitute a broad array of distinct
wholesale policy tools that, depending on particular state design, can favor
in-state power and discriminate against out-of-state power. States may not
"provid[e] a direct commercial advantage to local business."34 Laws that
attempt to arrest participation of out-of-state energy on an equal basis with
in-state energy risk violating the Commerce Clause.3 42
Such suspect laws can assume the form of added taxes and charges on
out-of-state goods.43 States are prohibited from attaching restrictions to
any goods that they import from other states.3" Furthermore, states cannot
regulate in ways such that the practical effect is to control conduct in other
states. 341 Where a state statute provided a tax exemption for sales of two
types of wine that were produced from in-state products, the effect was
practically state-specific discrimination without needing to mention the
state by name, and it was found to be discriminatory in violation of the
... Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328,338 (2008) (quoting Oregon Waste Sys. Inc. v.
Dep'tofEnvtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99(1994)).
... Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 200,209 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting
Natl Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2001)).
9 See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 16 (2002) ([T]ransmissions on the interconnected
national grids constitute transmissions in the interstate commerce.").
4 FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 757 (1982).
141 Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959).
342 See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 326-27, 343 (1989) (striking the requirement that
the price of beer be more than that charged out-of-state).
... See, e.g., Chem. Waste Mgmt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334,336-37 (1992) (invalidating an
Alabama law imposing an extra fee on imported hazardous waste).
4 C &A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994); see alsoW. Lynn
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186,192 (1994) ("The Commerce Clause... limits the power of the
[state] to adopt regulations that discriminate against interstate commerce.").
341 BeerInst., 491 U.S. at 336; seealso C &A Carbone, 511 U.S. 383 at 393.
COMPETITIVE ORDERS, THE FINAL MONOPOLY 123
Dormant Commerce Clause.346 States cannot regulate to favor, or require
use of, their own in-state energy resources even for a small percentage of
total use,34 7 nor can they, by regulation, harbor energy-related resources
originating in-state.348 States cannot give income tax credits to only in-state
producers of fuel additives.349 States cannot even require in-state fuels for
the rationale of satisfying federal Clean Air Act requirements.310 The
Supreme Court has consistently required that the regulation of power by
the states must not discriminate with regard to the origin of power or the
ultimate impact of the power, which may discourage its flow in interstate
commerce:
Our cases consistently have held that the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution . . . precludes a state from
mandating that its residents be given a preferred right of
access, over out-of-state consumers, to natural resources
located within its borders or to the products derived
therefrom . . . [A] "State is without power to prevent
privately owned articles of trade from being shipped and
sold in interstate commerce on the ground that they are
required to satisfy local demands or because they are
needed by the people of the State.35'
Recent federal court opinions construing state electric regulation have
scrupulously followed this doctrine.3" 2
B. State Anti-Competitive RPS Programs
RPSs at the state level do not raise constitutional Supremacy Clause
issues, but some state programs do raise Dormant Commerce Clause
3" See Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263,264 (1984).
... Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437,454-56 (1992) (showing that the Oklahoma statute
that was overturned involved only a 10% allocation of the market to in-state producers, which resulted
in the market changing from almost all out-of-state coal to "utilities purchased [in-state] Oklahoma
coal in amounts ranging from 3.4% to 7.4% of their annual needs," and a corresponding decline of
Wyoming coal purchases); see also Alliance for Clean Coal v. Craig, 840 F. Supp. 554, 560 (N.D. Ill.
1993).
s New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331,339 (1982).
141 See New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269,271,278-80 (1988).
0 Alliance for Clean Coalv. Miller, 44 F.3d 591,596 (7th Cir. 1995).
"' New EnglandPower Co., 455 U.S. at 338-89 (quoting Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v.
Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10 (1928)).
352 See, e.g., Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, L.L.C. v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393, 430 (2d Cir. 2013)
(citing New England Power Co., 455 U.S. at 338-339).
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issues. A number of the twenty-nine states with RPSs have incorporated
credit multipliers, geographic restrictions, or preferences to promote in-
state/in-region generation of power, to the exclusion of external power, in
the following percentages:
" Eight of the twenty-nine RPS states, or 27%, have
REC multipliers for in-state generation: Arizona,3
Colorado,5 4  Delaware,355  Maine,5 6  Michigan,5 r
Missouri,35 8 Nevada,359 and Washington.36 °
* Four of the RPS states, or 14%, including two states
that also provide for a geographically discriminatory
REC multiplier, have either a requirement or
preference for in-state generation: California,
361
Colorado,362 North Carolina,363 and Ohio.36 4
* Four of the twenty-nine RPS states, or 14%, give
program preferences to the use of in-state
manufactured products or in-state labor forces:
Arizona,365 Delaware,
366 Michigan,367 and Montana.368
" Eleven of the twenty-nine RPS states, representing
38% of RPS states, have a requirement for in-region,
rather than in-state, geographic location of generation
to create RECs, including one of the states that also
has in-state multipliers and one with an in-state
preference: Connecticut,
369  Illinois, 370  Maine,371
313 ARiz. ADMIN. CODE § R14-2-1806(D)-(E) (2014).
314 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 40-2-124(c)(V)(A)-(D), (c)(IX), (d) (2015).
311 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, §§ 356(a)(1), (d)-(e) (2015).
356 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 35-A, § 3605 (2015).
317 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 460.1039(1) (2015).
311 Mo. REV. STAT. § 393.1030(1) (2015).
3s9 NEV. REV. STAT. § 704.7822(2014).
360 WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 194-37-110(1)(c)(i)-(iii) (2015).
361 California: Renewables Portfolio Standard, DSIRE,
http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/84
0 (last updated Oct. 7, 2015) (explaining that a
maximum of 25% of RPS compliance can be achieved through the use of tradable renewable energy
credits; therefore, the remainder of the RPS compliance must be attained through in-state power sales).
36' COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-124(e)(ii)-(iii) (2015).
3 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133.8(b)(2)(e) (2014).
364 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.64(B)(3) (West 2015).
36 ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R14-2-1806(D)-(E) (2014).
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 26, § 351(b)-(c) (2015).
367 MICH. COMP. LAws § 460.1001(2)(a)-(d) (2015).
3 MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-3-2005(3)(a) (2015).
369 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-245a(b) (2015).
37 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 3855/1-56(b) (2014).
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Maryland,72 Massachusetts,7 3 New Hampshire,374
North Carolina,7 5  Ohio,376  Oregon,377
Pennsylvania,378 and Rhode Island.79
" Eleven of the twenty-nine states, or 38%, have an in-
state requirement for certain distributed power.
380
* Four of the twenty-nine states, or 14%, have a benefit
for an in-state capital component or labor.8 1
* Some states have multiple multipliers and
preferences.
38 2
* Only seven of the twenty-nine states, or 24%, have no
geographic preferences in their laws.
383
Recently, in a unanimous decision, Justice Richard Posner, for the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, relied on the scholarship of Professor
Steven Ferrey on the respective jurisdiction of state and federal
government to regulate electricity.384 The decision, in dicta, declared that a
state limiting RPSs to in-state generation violated the Commerce Clause:
"it trips over an insurmountable constitutional objection. Michigan
cannot, without violating the commerce clause of Article I of the
Constitution, discriminate against out-of-state renewable energy."385
Another suit in Colorado, involving in-state restriction on RPS RECs in
the state, motivated a change in state law, 386 and a suit on Missouri RPS
37165-407-311(A)-(C) ME. CODER. § 6 (LexisNexis 2015).
372 MD. CODE REGS. 20.61.03.02(A) (2015).
'" MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 25A, § 11F(a) (2015).
314 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362-F:6(1) (2015).
375 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133.8(b)(2)(e) (2014).
376 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.64(C)(5) (West 2015).
171 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 469A.135(1)(a), (2) (West 2015).
171 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1648.4 (West 2015).
3- 39 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-26-4(d) (2015).
380 Ferrey, supra note 318, at 75-77 (noting that resource eligibility in state RPS programs has
expanded beyond traditional renewables).
"
1 
Alternative Energy, supra note 280, at 292 (listing Arizona, Delaware, Michigan, and
Montana as having this in-state benefit).
302 Id. at 291-92.
383 Id. at 292.
4 See Ill. Commerce Comm'n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 776 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Ferrey, supra
note 318, at 106-07).
31 Id. (explaining that Michigan initiated the issue of in-state electric power discrimination in its
RPS program to demonstrate that transmitted out-of-state power was not of the same value as in-state
electricity, and therefore, that Michigan should not have to pay a share of power line tariffs transmitting
power from out of state).
386 Complaint for Injunctive & Declaratory Relief, Am. Tradition Inst. v. Colorado, 876 F.
Supp. 2d 1222 (D. Colo. 2012) (No. 1:1l-cv-00859-WJM-BNB), available at
http://www.americantradition.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/ATI-RPS-Complaint-ATI-v-
Colorado.pdf (explaining that the ATI, through its Environmental Law Center, filed a lawsuit in
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RECs limited only to in-state projects caused state withdrawal of the
program.387 As an additional note, Justice Scalia of the U.S. Supreme
Court, concurring in a majority opinion, submitted that, "subsidies for in-
state industry . . . would clearly be invalid under any formulation of the
Court's guiding principle" for Dormant Commerce Clause cases.3"'
C. Competition, the Meter, and Ownership
Regulated utilities are generally barred from providing solar
photovoltaic ("PV") units behind the meter on the customers' property to
sell to their own customers."9 Third-party ownership of residential PV
systems constitutes more than 60% of ownership in California and
Massachusetts, and more than 80% in Arizona and California.39 0 At this
time, utilities do not earn a profit on PV distributed generation which
others own.391  Some utilities propose that they be allowed recovery
through rate-base solar on customer rooftops, which very few states now
permit.
392
In 2014, Arizona Public Service Company ("APS"), a large Arizona-
regulated utility, filed a plan called AZ Sun DG with the Arizona
Corporation Commission, under which APS would lease conventional
consumer rooftops for its own PV generation purposes.393 Under a twenty-
year conventional lease, APS would pay homeowners $30/month (set off as
a billing credit) for use of their roofs to install and own 20 MW of solar
photoelectric systems on 3,000 customer homes.3 94 APS would itself incur
the capital, installation, and maintenance costs for 4-8 kW systems to be
placed on each of those 3,000 homes, which was estimated to cost $57-$70
federal court challenging the constitutionality of Colorado's renewable energy standard arguing that
because the state mandate provides economic benefits to Colorado's renewable electricity generators
that are not available to out-of-state power generators, the program violated the Dormant Commerce
Clause).
"' State ex rel. Mo. Energy Dev. Ass'n v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 386 S.W.3d 165 (Mo. Ct. App.
2012) (ruling that the RPS program "takes the cash property of utilities (and their ratepayers) and
transfers it to certain customers" without due process. The decision was reversed on appeal).
W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186,208 (1994) (ScaliaJ., concurring).
SeeJames Tong &Jon Wellinghoff, Tong & Wellinghoff: Should Utilities BeAllowed to Rate
Base Solar?, UTILITYDIVE (May 11, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/tong-wellinghoff-
should-utilities-be-allowed-to-rate-base-solar/396283/.
390 GTMRESEARCH, U.S. SOLAR MARKET INSIGHT REPORT: Q2 2013 (2013).
391 See Tong & Wellinghoff, supra note 389.
392 See id.
393 Bruce W. Radford, Rent the Rooftop:A New Front Opens in the Solar Wars, PUB. UTIL.
FORTNIGHTLY (Aug. 2014), http://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2014/08/rent-
rooftop#sthash.kJNGCRsO.dpuf.
394
Id.
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million in total, or $19,000-$24,350 per home ($3,000-$5,000/kW
installed). 39
The key distinction is that these would not be competitive distributed
generation; they would be on the utility side of the meter, which would be
below the roof at grade in the dwelling. Therefore, the power would be
regarded as any other generation project owned by the utility, but situated
on land and structures owned by the customer rather than the utility. Here,
however, the meter is the message: on which side of the meter placement
one constructs power generation is critical. APS would own both the PV
panels and their power output. All power would later be transacted as retail
power at the regulated retail rate.396
This is a means to accelerate the use of solar, but not to accelerate
competition in generation. It preserves utility use of the transmission and
distribution network, and customer contributions to the utility for all such
power. A representative of the Solar Energy Industries Association reacted:
In a move condemned by many solar companies in
Arizona, the state's largest utility, APS, has announced
that it will begin installing rooftop solar on customers'
homes . . . After attacking rooftop solar companies in
Arizona relentlessly for more than a year, this latest tactic
by APS has a 'Trojan Horse' smell to it. Our member
companies welcome fair and equal competition, but this
move would stack the deck in favor of a company which
can rate base solar with a guaranteed rate of return. How is
that fair? The Arizona Corporation Commission needs to
think this through very carefully.
397
The home customer receives $360/year, or more than $4,000 over
twenty years, for outlaying no capital, taking no risk, compromising none
of its electric service provisions, and having a "solar home."39' It is a
formula that is roughly equivalent to an approximately 50% reduction in
the cost of electric service.
With a median size of 5-6 kW PV array, APS might generate
something in the range of 8,000 kWh of electricity, which would have a
39
5 id.
396 Id. (differing from the so-called "Buy All, Sell All" business model, where the utility buys the
customer-owned output at the lower wholesale rate and sells back the power to customers at the higher
retail rate, thus still collecting and payment for transmission and istribution).
397 
Id.
3
9 Id.
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retail value of approximately $4,000/year, and a retail value of more than
twice that when delivered to a consumer account. The host consumer cuts
its electricity costs roughly in half with little to no risk, while the utility
generates power worth more than its out-of-pocket capital and operational
cost. The utility is also able to realize retail T & D charges associated with
all power, and the state realizes a policy goal of reducing criteria pollution
and carbon emissions, while going solar. The issue here, though, is whether
it promotes or hinders competition.
D. The Split Holdings on Liquid Energy-LCFS
In California, regulations regarding greenhouse gas reduction include
an element called the low carbon fuel standard (LCFS), the purpose of
which is to "reduce greenhouse gas emissions by reducing the full fuel-
cycle, carbon intensity of the transportation fuel pool used in California...
.1)" By the year 2020, the LCFS rule is to reduce the carbon content of
transportation fuels sold in California by 10% from the year 2010
baseline."' The LCFS regulates transportation fuels that are "sold,
supplied, or offered for sale in California" and focuses on the "carbon
intensity" of fuels ... ."01 Carbon intensity is not limited to how much
carbon the fuel contains, but also includes the amount of carbon released in
the full fuel cycle.402 Thus, the provider's carbon intensity score is affected
by the location of its commerce.
In a case in the Eastern District of California, Rocky Mountain Farmers
Union v. Goldstene,4°3 which is distinct from a somewhat similar suit
brought in California state court involving the LCFS rule, 404 plaintiffs
challenged the LCFS rule as being anti-competitive and violating the
"9 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95480 (2015).
o Id. § 95480.1(a)-(b) (2015).
401 
Id.
4"2 Id. § 95481(a)(16) (2010); id. § 95481(a)(38) ("lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions": "aggregate
quantity of greenhouse gas emissions (including direct emissions and significant indirect emissions
such as significant emissions from land use changes), as determined by the Executive Officer, related to
the full fuel lifecycle, including all stages of fuel and feedstock production and distribution, from
feedstock generation or extraction through the distribution and delivery and use of the finished fuel to
the ultimate consumer, where the mass values for all greenhouse gases are adjusted to account for their
relative global warming potential.").
4 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1081 (E.D. Cal. 2011).
4' Poet, L.L.C. v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. F064045, slip op. at 1 (Cal. Ct. App.June 3, 2013),
available at http://www.edforg/sites/default/files/5th%20appelate%20LCFS%20ruling%206.3.13.pdf
(arguing that CARB failed to respond to numerous public comments, that it omitted documents from
the rulemaking file, and that the LCFS will lead to increased GHG emissions, not the reductions it
promises; Poet alleged that CARB's LCFS rule exceeds the scope of authority delegated to it by the
legislature).
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Dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitution. " The LCFS regulation
incorporates the differences between indirectly associated carbon emissions
from transportation, the farming methods used to raise the agricultural
produce, and the fuel used to produce the electricity in the state where the
ethanol is produced into its calculations.4"6 In 2011, the federal district
court invalidated certain parts of the LCFS rule and enjoined the rule's
enforcement, as it "discriminate [d] against out-of-state corn-derived
ethanol while favoring in-state corn ethanol and impermissibly regulate[d]
extraterritorial conduct."40 7 The court held that the LCFS differentiated
based on place of origin of the commerce and concluded that it
discriminated on its face against out-of-state corn-derived ethanol.4 8
The trial court, however, found that the LCFS served a legitimate local
purpose, but the defendants had not met their burden to show that there is
not a nondiscriminatory means to adequately serve their objective.40 9 The
court found that California had several other means to address the state's
purpose without discriminating against out-of-state fuel products.4 10 The
court held that the LCFS "may not impose a barrier to interstate commerce
based on the distance that the product must travel in interstate
commerce."
411
In a split decision, with a dissent, the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial
court finding of unconstitutionality42 .The majority determined that it was
acceptable for a state to calculate transportation CO2 in the carbon
emissions index or rating of delivered fuel.413 A petition for a rehearing en
banc was denied, with members of the Ninth Circuit dissenting from that
denial noting that, "California could-under the majority's reasoning-
penalize out-of-state wineries to account for the environmental effects of
transporting their wines to California."414
40s Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1081.
Id. at 1088.
407 Id. at 1105.
40' Id. at 1087.
4"9 Id. at 1093 (showing that the plaintiffs offered many nondiscriminatory alternatives including
a tax on fossil fue s or solely regulating tailpipe emissions).
420 Id. at 1093-94 (citing Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951)).
411 Id. at 1089.
411 Id. at 1088.
413 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1088 (9th Cir. 2013).
414 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 740 F.3d 507,518 (9th Cir. 2014) (SmithJ.,
dissenting).
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E. Restriction of Power Flows and Power Fuel
In 2014, the Federal District Court for the District of Minnesota
struck down Minnesota's carbon emissions statute, finding that the statute
impermissibly regulated extraterritorial commerce in violation of the
Dormant Commerce Clause.415 The statute at issue, Minnesota's Next
Generation Energy Act ("NGEA"), sought to limit increases in "statewide
power sector carbon dioxide emissions."416 The statute prohibits any
"person" from importing or committing to import power from a new large
energy facility,417 or entering into a new long-term power purchase
agreement hat would contribute to statewide power sector carbon dioxide
emissions.418 The state of North Dakota, along with several coal-
dependent utilities and power plants, brought a lawsuit against Minnesota,
alleging the statute violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.41 9
The court held that a statute's plain meaning could not be
disregarded where its language is clear and unambiguous.420 It found the
statute per se invalid, because the plain language of the statute violated the
extraterritoriality doctrine when it "requires people or businesses to
conduct their out-of-state commerce in a certain way," regardless of
legislative intent or whether it has effects within the state.421 The "critical
inquiry," said the court, "is whether the practical effect of the regulation is
to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the State."422 A statute's
practical effect is evaluated not only by looking at its consequential effects,
but also at how it would interact with the legitimate regulatory schemes of
4" North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891, 919 (D. Minn. 2014).
416 Id. at 897 (citing MINN. STAT. § 216H.03, subd. 2 (2011) (defining "statewide power sector
carbon dioxide emissions" as "the total annual emissions of carbon dioxide from the generation of
electricity within the state and all emissions of carbon dioxide from the generation of electricity
imported from outside the state and consumed in Minnesota.")).
417 MINN. STAT. § 216H.03, subd. 3(2) (2015).
418 Id.
"' Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. at 899,903, 908 (showing that the Plaintiffs also claimed the statute
violates the Supremacy Clause, as it is preempted by the Clean Air Act, the Federal Power Act, and the
Privileges and Immunities Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, and therefore sought declaratory judgment. In 2012, the court granted partial judgment
on Counts IV and VI in favor of the defendants, found for the plaintiffs on Count I, and denied the
remaining counts as moot).
425 Id. at 909 (citing Cotto Waxo Co. v. Williams, 46 F.3d 790,792 (8th Cir. 1995)).
42 Id. at 910-11 (quoting Cotto Waxo Co., 46 F.3d at 793) (finding that because the NGEA
violated the extraterritoriality doctrine, it did not address whether the statute is discriminatory or
undergoes a balancing test).
422 Id. (quoting Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989)).
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other states, and what the effect there would be if many states adopted
similar legislation.423
In addition to regulating wholly out-of-state activity, the court
determined that the NGEA also improperly required out-of-state
merchants to seek regulatory approval before transacting with other non-
Minnesota entities.4 24 According to the court, if multiple states were to
adopt similar legislation, entities involved in an interconnected multi-state
system like MISO could potentially be subject to several state laws,
regardless of whether they were transacting commerce in those states.42 5
The "current marketplace for electricity would come to a grinding halt." 6
The Minnesota court treated electricity as distinct from other energy
sources, which it is both in terms of its physics and its status in American
law.4 27  The NGEA constitutes extraterritorial legislation and is per se
invalid under the Dormant Commerce Clause.42 ' The court held that
"[s]uch a scenario is 'just the kind of competing and interlocking local
economic regulation that the Commerce Clause was meant to
preclude.'429... 'any attempt directly to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction
over persons or property would offend sister States and exceed the inherent
limits of State's power.'
430
F. Massachusetts RPS Regulation
One example of a successful suit regarding state RPS comes from
Massachusetts where TransCanada Corporation, the owner of a Maine
wind project, alleged that Massachusetts' renewable energy tradable energy
credits under capped incentives was an uncompetitive program, and
therefore violated the Constitution.431 The suit alleged that Massachusetts'
423 Id.
424 Id. at918.
425 id.
426 Id.
427 Id. at 917.
42s Id. at 914.
429 Id. at 918 (citing Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 337 (1989)).
430 Id. at 911 (citing Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624,642 (1982)). North Dakota and
representatives of its coal industry also sued Minnesota on Article VI grounds, alleging that it imposed
constitutional violations when it affected the wholesale price and transmission of power within
exclusive federal wholesale electricity pricing authority. The court did not need to reach this issue,
having already found the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 911-12.
431 Complaint 24, TransCanada Power Mktg. Ltd. v. Bowles et al., No. 4:10-cv-40070-FDS
(D. Mass. April 16, 2010), available at
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/XlQ6LBO8DLO2?imagename=1-1.pdf (requires
Bloomberg account access); Erin Ailworth, State Looking to Settle Suit Over Law on Clean Energy,
BOSTON GLOBE (May 27, 2010),
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limitation on eligible Solar Renewable Energy Credits ("SRECs"), as well
as issuance of long-term power purchase contracts only to Massachusetts
companies, discriminated against out-of-state renewable energy projects in
violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause.432 After stating that it had
confidence in its position, Massachusetts immediately settled the litigation
and provided the plaintiff relief.433
G. Federal Precedent on State Net Metering Incentives
If applicable federal law limited net metering, it would reduce the
competition from on-site generation. FERC decisions have created
questions, but have not yet formally reached answers as to whether state
net-metering rules can apply to all of these net power export
transactions.4 34 In 2001, the FERC rejected the utility MidAmerican
Energy Company's challenge to Iowa's net metering rule,435 concluding
that "no sale occurs when an individual homeowner.., installs generation
and accounts for its dealings with the utility through the practice of
netting. "436 The MidAmerican decision suggests, but did not need to reach
on the facts presented, that a wholesale sale occurs when the customer has
transferred more power to the utility through net metering than the
customer has purchased from the utility over the course of the billing
period.437
In a 2009 decision, FERC defined net metering as:
A participant in a net metering program must be a net
consumer of electricity - but for portions of the day or
portions of the billing cycle, it may produce more
http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2010/05/27/lawsuit hits-mass-law-promoting-local-energ
y-providers/.
432 Id. at 25.
431 See Partial Settlement Agreement, TransCanada Power Mktg. Ltd. v. Bowles et al., No. 4:10-
cv-40070-FDS (D. Mass. Apr. 16, 2010), available at
http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/doer/renewables/solar/settlement-agreement.pdf.
3 MidAmerican Energy Co., 94 F.E.R.C. 61,340, at 62,263 (2001); See Sun Edison L.L.C.,
129 FERC 61,146, at 61,620 (2009).
411 MidAmerican Energy Co., 94 F.E.R.C. at 62,263.
4 3 6 
Id.
431 See id. 62,262. In its order, FERC also held that a one-month time interval during which
the net metering process may take place is allowable. Id. 62,264. Previously, FERC had only
permitted net metering to be measured over a one-hour interval, though it stated that it was open to
considering other time periods. Id. 62,263. Since the determination as to whether federal law applies
focuses on whether the customer has made a net sale at the end of the billing cycle, the allowable length
of the billing cycle is crucial. Id.
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electricity than it can use itself. This electricity is sent back
onto the Transmission System to be consumed by other
end-users. Since the program participant is still a net
consumer of electricity, it receives an electric bill at the end
of the billing cycle that is reduced by the amount of energy
sold back to the utility.438
This 2009 decision held that the owner of the power and/or the user of
the power engaged in qualified netting of power only to the extent hat less
power was sold to the grid by the renewable generator than purchased from
the grid.43 9 Net metering has come under limited legal attack for allowing
large freestanding wholesale power generation units to reap a high retail
credit value.440
VI. LEGAL FRICTION BETWEEN COMPETITIVE FORCES AND POWER
For the country to transition to greater competition in power, it will
require both coordinated federal and state regulatory decisions. Each level
of government in our federalist system, and under the Federal Power Act,
exercises distinct jurisdiction regarding the physical and transactional
aspects of power.441 With regard to state authority to exercise state
incentives which can favor in-state commerce:
0 FITs have been struck as illegal/unconstitutional;42
4 Sun Edison L.L.C., 129 F.E.R.C. at 61,620. Sun Edison constructed, financed, operated, and
maintained solar-powered generation facilities at host sites. Id. 61,618. Sun Edison asked FERC to
confirm that subsidiary sales do not constitute a wholesale in interstate commerce or a transmission of
electric energy in interstate commerce for purposes of the Federal Power Act, nor involve jurisdictional
rates for purposes of the Public Utility Holding Company Act. Id.
... See id. Of note, most states have adopted "one year" as the carryover period for accumulated
credits, after which they are either ceded to the utility or cashed out from the customer at avoided cost.
See UNLOCKING, supra note 308, at 280-88. By paying customers the avoided cost rate at the end of the
twelve-month period, utilities are complying with the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA),
which requires utilities to purchase Qualiying Facilities' (QF) power at the avoided cost rate. See 16
U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (2011). In addition, many states, such as NewJersey and Colorado, limit the size of
eligible renewable energy systems to that meet the requirements of the particular net metering
customer. See NJ. ADMIN. CODE § 14:8-4.3.a (2008); 4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-3:3664
(LexisNexis 2015).
440 See Docket No. D-10-126 - Division of Public Utilities and Carriers' ("Division" ) Investigation
Into Net Metering Complaint Relating to the Town of Portsmouth Wind Generating Facility, RHODE
ISLAND PUB. UTILS. COMM'N., http://www.ripuc.org/eventsactions/docketID-10-126page.html (last
modified Apr. 3, 2014).
441 See Sun Edison L.L. C., 129 F.E.R.C. at 61,620.
442 See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 132 F.E.R.C. 61,047, at 61,338 (2010).
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* The methods that some states have used to implement
RPSs are unconstitutional; the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals declared in-state renewable energy resource
favoritism unconstitutional in 2013;
43
* Recent federal adjudicatory orders cast uncertainty on
some states' design of net metering.444
While states have broad, separate energy regulatory authority to
promote competition under the Federal Power Act, they are not without
significant legal limitation.44' Constitutional requirements are superior to
the exercise of any state authority. At the time of the Constitution, there
was no such thing as electric power or interstate power networks.4 6 Some
states have exercised their authority to promote more competition and
incentives for certain favored technologies, but do so in ways that promote
in-state interests and discriminate against interstate commerce. 447 This has
triggered successful suits under the Dormant Commerce Clause of the
Constitution; states cannot support competition through regulation in
constitutionally discriminatory manners or manipulate wholesale power
prices to do so. '4
Pursuant to separate federal authority, the federal government has
promoted competition in power transactions and transmission for two
decades.449 PURPA and federal tax credits and incentives have provided a
significant foundation for new renewable energy development. FERC
regulation and orders mandating greater competition in transmission of
power, more flexible scheduling of intermittent renewable power resources,
and no rights of first refusal for monopoly incumbent transmission of
power have moved the interstate power system to greater competition.
However, the scope of federal jurisdiction has been limited pursuant to
the authority under the Federal Power Act and the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution. To construct a more competitive power system, the
443 11. Commerce Comm'n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 776 (7th Cir. 2013).
' Sun Edison L.L.C., 129 F.E.R.C. at 61,621.
44s LAWRENCE R. GREENFIELD, AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY
COMMISSION AND FEDERAL REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 12
(2010), available at http://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does/fercl0l.pdf.
446 See NEW RULES, supra note 5, at 261 (stating that power was first harnessed by Thomas
Edison in 1878, a century into the formation of America).
44' See discussion supra Section IV.
44' See discussion supra Section V.
449 FED. ENERGY REG. COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON COMPETITION IN
WHOLESALE AND RETAIL MARKETS FOR ELECTRIC ENERGY 2 (2006), available at
http://www.ferc.gov/legal/fed-sta/ene-pol-act/epact-final-rpt.pdf.
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nation needs to interconnect the nation with copper wire to be able to
transmit power competitively across state jurisdictional borders, and the
courts have not allowed federal power to extend to transmission siting.
45 0
Nor have the courts allowed federal FERC power to extend to allow
demand response resources to compete equally with power generation.45'
There are significant legal anomalies, however, as federal courts have
recently stricken some federal energy initiatives.4 2
We proceed into the twentieth century with fifty separate states, and
the federal government exercising simultaneous jurisdiction over different
aspects of power in America. No other article of commerce is subject to the
split federal-state jurisdictional authority embodied in the Federal Power
Act and enforced through the Constitution. Yet, the power that is
regulated does not change in any state in commerce;453 it remains an energy
field transmitted as an alternating current at 60 Hertz and cycles per
second.454 We have a legally differentiated regulatory system, with different
incentives for competition or monopoly of generation and distribution in
different states, for the most identical and uniform object in American
commerce. In this legal mosaic, these various legal rules and holdings will
sculpt the future of competition in power.
450 See discussion supra Section III.D.2.
451 See discussion supra Section III.
452 See discussion supra Sections III.C.1, III.D.4.
453 NEW RULES, supra note 5, at 260-70 (providing a brief history of electric power). Until the
early twentieth century, various suppliers provided electricity at different voltages, ranging from 100-
600 volts and 40-133 cycles per second. Id. For the past century, electricity in the United States has
been standardized at a set frequency of alternating current. See also World Electricity Standards,
QUANTUM BALANCING, http://www.quantumbalancing.com/worldelectricity/electricityif.htm (last
visited Oct. 25, 2015).
"' World Electricity Standards, supra note 453.
